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Legal scholarship and practice have made too little use of logical theory,1 and as a result are
making too little progress in understanding the formal structure of legal reasoning and factfinding,
in developing effective methods of searching legal information, and in automating legal reasoning
through artificial intelligence. Although legal theorists have generally acknowledged the role of
traditional deductive logics,2 they have seldom used developments in many-valued logics3 and
nonmonotonic logics.4 By contrast, other fields of study are using logical theories to their
advantage. The field of linguistics, for example, uses logical theory to study the knowledge
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1

Logical theory studies those patterns of reasoning that ought to be persuasive to a reasonable person
seeking knowledge. Logic therefore studies reasonable inference, even when it is performed by artificial
agents. Logical research is distinct from research into the patterns of reasoning that are in fact persuasive
to human beings – research in such fields as psychology, rhetoric, and cognitive science. See, e.g.,
DOUGLAS WALTON, LEGAL ARGUMENTATION AND EVIDENCE 347 (2002) (contrasting logical uses of
argument with psychological or rhetorical uses).
2

For example, legal theorists have occasionally recognized the benefits of logical analysis in law. See,
e.g., Mark L. Movsesian, Rediscovering Williston, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 207, 241-43 (2005)
(describing Williston’s view that the use of “analytic logic” in law has pedagogical benefits, “promotes
predictability and stability in law,” and “makes the legal system more acceptable to the general public”);
TERENCE ANDERSON & WILLIAM TWINING, ANALYSIS OF EVIDENCE: HOW TO DO THINGS WITH FACTS
BASED ON WIGMORE’S SCIENCE OF JUDICIAL PROOF 63-69 (1991) (showing that for Wigmore the
principle utility of the deductive form of inference was “to force into prominence the generalization upon
which the inference rests,” and thereby “to discover the real points of weakness of inference”).
3

E.g., SIEGFRIED GOTTWALD, A TREATISE ON MANY-VALUED LOGICS (2001); GRZEGORZ
MALINOWSKI, MANY-VALUED LOGICS (1993).
4

E.g., GERHARD BREWKA, JÜRGEN DIX, & KURT KONOLIGE, NONMONOTONIC REASONING: AN
OVERVIEW (1997); HENRY E. KYBURG, JR. & CHOH MAN TENG, UNCERTAIN INFERENCE 117-51 (2001);
ISAAC LEVI, FOR THE SAKE OF ARGUMENT 120-59 (1996); HENRY PRAKKEN, LOGICAL TOOLS FOR
MODELLING LEGAL ARGUMENT 67-100 (1997). In its broadest sense, nonmonotonic reasoning is
reasoning to plausible conclusions on the basis of incomplete information. BREWKA ET AL., supra, at ix.
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possessed by native speakers about the meaning of ordinary language.5 The field of artificial
intelligence uses logical theory to capture human knowledge in particular domains and to model
human reasoning patterns.6 Judging from results in these other fields, the cost to legal theory and
practice from failing to use developments in logic may be very high.
This article uses advances in the study of default reasoning to develop a paradigm for
modeling all aspects of legal reasoning, including legal factfinding.7 Default reasoning uses
inference rules, together with the available evidence, to warrant presumptive conclusions, which are
then subject to future revision.8 Such reasoning patterns possess four important characteristics. First,
default reasoning is practical, because reasonable decision-makers rely on the conclusions to justify
their decisions and guide their actions.9 Such reasoning is also dynamic, because the degree of
support from the evidence and analysis to the conclusion can change over time, and multiple parties
5

For applications of logical analysis to semantic theories about the meaning of ordinary language, see,
e.g., GENNARO CHIERCHIA & SALLY MCCONNELL-GINET, MEANING AND GRAMMAR: AN
INTRODUCTION TO SEMANTICS 53-193 (2d ed. 2000); RICHARD LARSON & GABRIEL SEGAL,
KNOWLEDGE OF MEANING: AN INTRODUCTION TO SEMANTIC THEORY 25-359 (1995); JOHN I. SAEED,
SEMANTICS 86-115, 292-341 (2d ed. 2003).
6

For applications of logical analysis to the design of artificial intelligence systems, see, e.g., STUART
J. RUSSELL & PETER NORVIG, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE: A MODERN APPROACH 194-374, 523-28 (2d
ed. 2003) (discussing logical agents and knowledge representation); Munindar P. Singh, Anand S. Rao, &
Michael P. Georgeff, Formal Methods in DAI: Logic-Based Representation and Reasoning, in
MULTIAGENT SYSTEMS: A MODERN APPROACH TO DISTRIBUTED ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 331-76
(Gerhard Weiss ed., 1999) (discussing logic-based methods for describing and reasoning about artificial
agents).
7

For discussions of the logic of default reasoning, see, e.g., PHILIPPE BESNARD, AN INTRODUCTION
TO DEFAULT LOGIC (1989); BREWKA ET AL., supra note 4, at 2-3, 40-51; KYBURG & TENG, supra note 4,
at 121-34; LEVI, supra note 4, at 200-33; JOHN L. POLLOCK, NOMIC PROBABILITY AND THE
FOUNDATIONS OF INDUCTION (1990); PRAKKEN, supra note 4; STEPHEN TOULMIN, RICHARD RIEKE, &
ALLAN JANIK, AN INTRODUCTION TO REASONING (2d ed. 1984); DOUGLAS N. WALTON, ARGUMENT
SCHEMES FOR PRESUMPTIVE REASONING (1996); WALTON, supra note 1.
8

Legal scholars have long recognized the presumptive nature of legal reasoning. See, e.g., Movsesian,
supra note 2, at 244 (documenting that for Williston, “[l]egal logic … is a matter of ‘[p]resumptions and
probabilities;’ it indicates the likely result, at least in the absence of serious practical difficulties”).
9

See WALTON, supra note 7, at 11, 56 (defining practical reasoning as “a kind of goal-directed,
knowledge-based reasoning that is directed to choosing a prudent course of action for an agent that is
aware of its present circumstances”). In order to ensure that logical theory remains practical, the defaultlogic paradigm of this article adopts the strategic policy that no logical concepts are introduced unless
they are useful in solving an actual legal problem.
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can participate in the reasoning process. Third, default reasoning is defeasible, meaning that new
evidence or a re-analysis of old evidence can defeat an earlier conclusion or undermine its
evidentiary support.10 Nevertheless, in the absence of such defeating considerations, default
reasoning is presumptively valid if the reasoning behind it is sound – that is, it is reasonable to treat
the (provisional) conclusion as being probably true.11 The default-logic paradigm introduced here
builds these four characteristics into its model of legal reasoning.
This article lays out the default-logic paradigm in three major parts. Part I introduces
“implication trees” and three-valued logic, as well as additional logical structures needed to model
legal rules and policies. This rule-based framework integrates statutes, regulations, and caselaw with
factfinding, and makes factfinding more efficient. Part II introduces “plausibility schemas,” manyvalued logic, and theories of uncertainty, together with other logical concepts needed to evaluate
evidence. Rational factfinding extends the rule-based tree structure into the realm of evidence
evaluation, and integrates expert and lay evidence into single patterns of reasoning. Part III uses the
logical structures introduced in Parts I and II to model legal rules about procedure and evidence, and
to evaluate decisions that apply those rules to particular cases. The complete default-logic paradigm
provides an “inference tree” that can formalize the legal reasoning found in any actual case
(including the rules, policies, evidence, rulings, and findings in the case), can suggest how such
reasoning could be improved, and can provide the structure needed to automate important segments
of that reasoning. The article therefore provides a paradigm for modeling any instance of legal
reasoning and factfinding.
I.

LEGAL RULES AND IMPLICATION TREES

An essential characteristic of legal reasoning is its rule-based nature.12 Rules of law identify
the conditions under which governmental action is legitimate. Governmental institutions adopt legal
rules in a variety of ways (e.g., by means of statutes, regulations, executive orders, and judicial
10

See JOHN L. POLLOCK & JOSEPH CRUZ, CONTEMPORARY THEORIES OF KNOWLEDGE 36-37 (2d ed.
1999); PRAKKEN, supra note 4, at 47-49, 52-53, 56-61; WALTON, supra note 1, at 6, 52.
11
12

WALTON, supra note 1, at 52.

For a discussion of the advantages of rule-based reasoning in the context of the “new formalism” in
contract theory, see Movsesian, supra note 2, at 224-29 (stating that new formalists advocate formalism
“because it advances important pragmatic values like certainty, stability, and efficiency”; that “the new
formalists believe that legal rules have merely presumptive force,” and that “pragmatic or ethical
considerations” can overcome that presumption; and that they seek to give formalism a theoretical and
empirical foundation).
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judgments), and those rules govern other governmental decisions. The default-logic paradigm
models the role of such rules in legal reasoning. This Part of the article introduces “implication
trees” – the default-logic structure used to capture legal rules. Part II will add logical structures for
modeling the application of such rules to particular cases.
A.

Implication Trees as Models of Legal Rules

In the default-logic model, a legal rule is a universally applicable, conditional proposition. It
is a conditional proposition of the form “if p, then q,” where p and q stand for two constituent
propositions. A legal rule states that finding proposition p (the condition) to be true warrants finding
q (the conclusion) to be true also. A proposition is the meaning or informational content of an
assertion, usually expressed in ordinary language by a sentence or clause.13 Moreover, a legal rule is
universal in application – it warrants making the inference in all situations described by the
condition in the “if” clause. If there are any exceptions to the rule, other rules should identify those
exceptions and govern the reasoning in those exceptional cases. A legal rule, therefore, identifies an
acceptable line of legal reasoning to a conclusion in all similar cases, where the relevant similarity is
specified by the rule’s condition.
The default-logic model reflects the dynamic nature of legal reasoning by assigning to the
propositions of legal rules one of three truth-values: true, false, or undecided.14 When legal
reasoning begins in a particular situation, the truth-values of the conditions and conclusions of the
13

Distinctions should be made between sentences and propositions, and between linguistics and logic.
A sentence is a linguistic unit consisting of words, phrases, clauses and other grammatical elements, while
a proposition is the logical content of a statement or assertion, which is capable of being true or false.
IRVING M. COPI & CARL COHEN, INTRODUCTION TO LOGIC 5-6 (10th ed. 1998); MARK SAINSBURY,
LOGIC FORMS: AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHICAL LOGIC 25-28 (1991). Different sentences, either in
the same language or in different languages, can express the same proposition. COPI & COHEN, supra, at
5-6. Linguistics studies the grammatical structure of ordinary languages, while logic studies the reasoning
structure expressed in those languages. See, e.g., LARSON & SEGAL, supra note 5, at 1, 9-11, 22-24, 67-76
(distinguishing semantic and syntactic theory from logical theory).
14

A system of legal rules based on more than three truth-values would be very complicated and
largely unprincipled. It would be complicated because it would require rules for the different truth-values
of an antecedent condition. For example, the legal implication of a condition that is very likely to be true
could be different than the implication if the condition is only probably true. But if there is a difference
between two such rules, then there should be policy reasons for treating the two cases differently, and it
might be very difficult to give such reasons to cover all permutations in a many-valued systems. As
discussed infra in Part II, a three-valued system in the rule-based portion of reasoning allows a basis for
harmonizing factfinder evaluation of the evidence, without imposing on the factfinder any particular
truth-value system to use in evaluating that evidence.

Vern R. Walker

June 2006; Page 5

A Default-Logic Paradigm for Legal Reasoning and Factfinding
CONFIDENTIAL DRAFT: PLEASE DO NOT QUOTE OR CITE
applicable legal rules are undecided. The evidence and reasoning may change the truth-values of
conditions (or “factual triggers”) for rules, which may in turn change the truth-values of
conclusions. Traditional two-valued logic paid insufficient attention to the dynamics of truth-value
change, and constructed static models for only the end results of reasoning. The default-logic
paradigm, by contrast, incorporates dynamic reasoning into the logical structure, and can therefore
provide an understanding of the flow of rule-based reasoning.
The condition of a legal rule normally has a complex logical structure. It is usually a set of
propositions that are connected by one or more of three logical operators: AND, OR, and UNLESS.
Rules with conditions connected by “AND” are called conjunctive rules, and each constituent
proposition of the condition is called a conjunct.15 An example of a conjunctive rule is the tort rule
identifying the factual elements of a plaintiff’s prima facie case for battery:16
If the defendant performed a voluntary act, AND
the defendant acted intending to cause a harmful or offensive contact with
a person, AND
the defendant’s act caused a harmful or offensive contact with the
plaintiff,
then the defendant is subject to liability to the plaintiff for battery.
A conjunctive rule requires the proof of all of its conjuncts before it warrants drawing the
conclusion.17 Rules may also be disjunctive, with the constituent propositions of the condition
15

Logical conjunction models part of the meaning of many ordinary-language words and phrases,
including “and,” “also,” “moreover,” “but,” “yet,” “nevertheless,” and “although.” For discussions of
using conjunction to model the propositions expressed by English sentences, see, e.g., COPI & COHEN,
supra note 13, at 345-47; ROBERT E. RODES, JR. & HOWARD POSPESEL, PREMISES AND CONCLUSIONS:
SYMBOLIC LOGIC FOR LEGAL ANALYSIS 17-27 (1997); SAINSBURY, supra note 13, at 62-65.
16

See, e.g., RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, SECOND §§ 2, 13, 18; DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 4763 (2000).
17

The following table defines the truth-function for three-valued conjunction in an implication tree. In
the table, the three truth-values are: F = false, U = undecided, and T = true. The top row and left column
list the possible truth-values of the two conjuncts, while the cells in the table specify the resulting truthvalue of the conclusion.
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(disjuncts) connected by the logical connective “OR.”18 With a disjunctive rule, proving any one or
more of the disjuncts is sufficient for proving the conclusion.19 For example, the tort causes of
action in battery and in negligence are two alternative ways to prove that the defendant is liable to
the plaintiff for compensatory damages. The third type of default-logic connective is “defeater,”
denoted by “UNLESS.”20 With a defeater rule, if the condition (defeater proposition) is true, then
the rule warrants the conclusion to be false.21 An example of a defeater is an affirmative defense to a
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See the definition of the many-valued connective “et1”, GOTTWALD, supra note 3, at 66.
18

Logical disjunction models part of the meaning of the ordinary-language words “or” and “either …
or … .” For discussions of using disjunction to model the propositions expressed by English sentences,
see, e.g., COPI & COHEN, supra note 13, at 348-50; RODES & POSPESEL, supra note 15, at 59-73;
SAINSBURY, supra note 13, at 65-68.
19

The following table defines the truth-function for three-valued disjunction in an implication tree. In
the table, the three truth-values are: F = false, U = undecided, and T = true. The top row and left column
list the possible truth-values of the two disjuncts, while the cells in the table specify the resulting truthvalue of the conclusion.
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See the definition of the many-valued connective “vel1”, GOTTWALD, supra note 3, at 90.
20

Logical defeater can model part of the meaning of such words and phrases as “unless,” “provided
that,” and “except when.” For logical discussions of the defeater connective, see BREWKA ET AL., supra
note 4, at 2-3, 16; POLLOCK, supra note 7, at 79. Also see infra note 64.
21

Unless a defeater proposition is true, the truth-value of the conclusion remains what it would have
been in the absence of a defeater proposition.
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cause of action. A prima facie case for battery can be defeated by the privilege to use reasonable
force under certain conditions, such as when the defendant is making a lawful arrest or defending
herself from intentionally inflicted bodily harm.22
Conjunctive, disjunctive, and defeater connectives are truth-functional in operation – that is,
the truth-value of the conclusion is entirely a function of the truth-values of the constituent
propositions in the condition. The truth-function for each connective determines the truth-value of
the conclusion based on the truth-values of the constituent propositions in the condition.23 Their
truth-functional nature makes it straightforward to capture their operation completely within
artificial intelligence software.24
The default-logic paradigm constructs “implication trees” to model complex legal rules and
chains of such rules.25 Implication trees start with the ultimate conclusion at the top and branch
downward, making an inverted tree. For example, the following implication tree models the
plaintiff’s prima facie case for battery:

22

See, e.g., RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, SECOND §§ 63-76, 112-39; DOBBS, supra note 16, at 159-70,
190-204.
23

On the concept of truth-functional connectives generally, see, e.g., COPI & COHEN, supra note 13, at
345-46; RODES & POSPESEL, supra note 15, at 96-104; SAINSBURY, supra note 13, at 49-51.
24

See RUSSELL & NORVIG, supra note 6, at 206-10, 524.

25

A number of legal theorists have analyzed portions of legal reasoning as having a tree-like structure.
See, e.g., ANDERSON & TWINING, supra note 2, at 108-55 (concluding that “Wigmorean charts are a
species of what today are sometimes described as ‘directed acyclic graphs’”); JOSEPH B. KADANE &
DAVID A. SCHUM, A PROBABILISTIC ANALYSIS OF THE SACCO AND VANZETTI EVIDENCE 66-74 (1996)
(developing inference networks as directed acyclic graphs with the root node – the ultimate issue to be
proved – at the top, and the chains of reasoning extending from the evidence at the bottom upward to the
root node); DAVID A. SCHUM, EVIDENTIAL FOUNDATIONS OF PROBABILISTIC REASONING 156-94 (1994)
(interpreting Wigmorean evidence charts as “directed acyclic graphs whose nodes indicate propositions
and whose arcs represent fuzzy probabilistic linkages among these nodes”); WALTON, supra note 1, at
338-48 (discussing argument diagramming). For a discussion of the tree-like inference structure
developed by Schum and Kadane, see Vern R. Walker, Language, Meaning, and Warrant: An Essay on
the Use of Bayesian Probability Systems in Legal Factfinding, 39 JURIMETRICS 391, 392-404 (1999).
Within formal logic, tableau structures are sometimes used to analyze truth-values of complex
formulae. E.g., GOTTWALD, supra note 3, at 16, 138-39 (discussing, for many-valued logics, the use of a
“tableau tree” to indicate “the conditions which have to be met to give some wff [well-formed formula]
the truth value”).
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Such a logic diagram shows that, according to this rule, the upper-level proposition is warranted to
be true if all three lower-level propositions are true. An implication tree models a legal rule as two
adjacent levels, with the upper level stating the conclusion of the rule, a logical connective between
the two levels specifying the truth-function involved, and the lower level identifying the constituent
propositions of the condition. Each proposition in the lower level might then become the conclusion
of another rule, whose condition would add yet a lower level to the implication tree.
This logical structure constitutes an inverted “tree” because the branches from upper-level
propositions to lower-level propositions never loop back to a higher level, but continue to expand
downward.26 In principle, the substantive legal rules of tort law that can warrant compensatory
damages can be modeled as one large implication tree. For example, the implication tree for battery
might begin as follows:

26

See KADANE & SCHUM, supra note 25, at 71 (constructing evidence charts that are directed acyclic
graphs and “resemble trees whose branches seem to converge to a single trunk or root”); SCHUM, supra
note 25, at 169-73 (discussing directed acyclic graphs).
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According to these rules, if the plaintiff proves all three of the conjuncts at the bottom, then the
defendant is liable to the plaintiff for battery, unless the defendant proves that she was privileged to
perform the action she did. The defendant can establish a privilege by proving either that she acted
reasonably in making a lawful arrest or that she acted reasonably in defending herself from harmful
contact. This logic diagram also displays how the defeater connective operates. Defeater functions
as a kind of switch that can, under the specified condition, override the inference that would
otherwise occur.
The goal in constructing an implication tree is to model all of the legally acceptable lines of
reasoning that can prove or disprove the ultimate issue stated by the conclusion at the top of the tree.
The three logical connectives model all the ways that lower-level propositions can combine to prove
or disprove upper-level propositions. At the bottom level of each branch of a tree, where the legal
rules end, the constituent propositions in the conditions of those last rules are the “terminal”
propositions of the tree. The truth-value for a terminal proposition cannot be determined by lower
rules in the tree, for by definition there are no further legal rules. Taken together, the set of all the
terminal propositions for a tree is the set of all possible findings that are relevant for proving or
disproving the ultimate issue at the top. The terminal propositions are the issues of fact to be
determined by the factfinder. Part II of this article examines the reasoning of the factfinder in
making such findings. The implication-tree structure, however, shows the role of legal rules in
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elaborating the single ultimate issue at the top into a potentially large set of terminal propositions at
the bottom.27
Implication trees display graphically many default-logic features of legal rules. First,
implication trees make every step of the reasoning transparent, by showing the conditions that are
relevant to warranting the conclusion and the logical connectives within that inference. Second,
implication trees that model all of the acceptable lines of reasoning that can warrant a particular
conclusion can be said to capture the legal meaning or significance of the conclusion. A complete
implication tree for battery shows what the law of torts means by “battery.” Third, implication trees
suggest possible strategies for proving or warranting intermediate and ultimate conclusions. A
graphical representation can present a large amount of information at one time. It can show how all
possible reasoning “fits together,” while retaining detailed information within the branches of the
tree.
Implication trees also display the dynamics of the reasoning. The implication tree for
battery, for example, suggests the dynamic structure of a prima facie case, a rebuttal, and an
exception or affirmative defense. The main conjunctive branch of the tree shows what the plaintiff
must prove in order to establish a prima facie case. The defendant, in response, has three options for
defending against the plaintiff’s claim. First, the defendant can rebut the truth of one or more of the
constituent propositions of the plaintiff’s prima facie case. Second, the defendant can assert an
affirmative defense and prove the truth of one or more defeater propositions. Third, the defendant
can argue for a change in the legal rules – that is, argue for a change in the shape of the implication
tree itself.
In addition to implication trees, the default-logic paradigm uses concept-based entailments
to model supplemental legal rules. Traditional predicate logic analyzes propositions into a logical
predicate and one or more logical subjects, and those logical components can form the factual
conditions for legal rules.28 A logical predicate is the element of a proposition that indicates what is
27

An important corollary is that adopting a new legal rule not only expands the implication tree
downward, but almost always expands it horizontally as well, increasing the number of terminal
propositions. Adopting new legal rules almost always adds new issues of fact and increases the
complexity of the legal cases brought using the implication tree.
28

For general discussions of predicate logic, see, e.g., COPI & COHEN, supra note 13, at 428-65;
RODES & POSPESEL, supra note 15, at 113-206; SAINSBURY, supra note 13, at 133-219.
For applications of predicate logic to semantic theories about the meaning of sentences, see, e.g.,
LARSON & SEGAL, supra note 5, at 115-226, 319-59 (discussing the meaning of verbs and predication,
proper nouns, pronouns, demonstratives, and definite descriptions); CHIERCHIA & MCCONNELL-GINET,
supra note 5, at 53-193 (developing a referential or denotational approach to meaning, based on predicate
logic); SAEED, supra note 5, at 292-341 (discussing a formal or logical semantics based on predicate
logic).
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being affirmed or denied about one or more subjects. For example, the proposition “the plaintiff has
developed cancer” classifies the plaintiff (the logical subject) as a member of the class of persons
who have developed cancer (“… has developed cancer” being the logical predicate). A logical
subject is an element of a proposition that names, denotes, or refers to one or more objects or events
that the proposition is about.29 Analyzed from a predicate-logic perspective, therefore, a proposition
asserts something (expressed by the predicate) about one or more objects or events (named by the
subject or subjects).
Logical predicates and subjects employ concepts (expressed by nouns, adjectives, adverbs,
and other grammatical types) that can be linked by legal rules. Some rules identify class/sub-class
relationships among concepts, such that any attribute of members of the class is necessarily an
inherited attribute of members of the sub-class. For example, if a specific individual Jones is a
defendant, then the class/sub-class relationship “party/defendant,” warrants that Jones is also a
party, and has all the attributes that attach to being a party (e.g., having a right to be notified about
proceedings that determine his rights and obligations).30 Other legal rules combine multiple
concepts into a set of jointly sufficient conditions for applying a predicate to a subject. For example,
being both a “party” to a lawsuit and a “corporation” means that citizenship for purposes of
diversity jurisdiction in federal court is determined by the corporation’s state of incorporation and
its principal place of business.31 A definition of a word or concept combines both types of
relationship (necessary and jointly sufficient conditions) into a single statement of equivalence.32
29

In English, the grammatical subject of a sentence usually identifies a subject of the proposition
expressed by the sentence. Grammatical and logical form, however, are not necessarily identical. An
English sentence may have a single grammatical subject, but the proposition that it expresses might have
multiple logical subjects. For example, the sentence “Jones leases the property from Smith” has a single
grammatical subject (Jones), but asserts a relationship among three logical subjects (Jones, the particular
property, and Smith).
30

See FLEMING JAMES, JR., GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR., & JOHN LEUBSDORF, CIVIL PROCEDURE §
2.10, at 72-73 (4th ed. 1992).
31
32

28 U.S.C. § 1332(c).

A definition supplies words, phrases or expressions that have the same meaning as the word, phrase
or expression to be defined. See COPI & COHEN, supra note 13, Chapter 5; BARUCH A. BRODY, LOGIC:
THEORETICAL AND APPLIED 21-27 (1973); LARSON & SEGAL, supra note 5, Chapter 4. When a definition
equates the truth-conditions of two predicates, then using either predicate can assert an equivalent
proposition about a subject. Identifying necessary and sufficient truth-conditions displays warrant, but
does not necessarily exhaust the ordinary meaning of an asserted proposition.
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These kinds of rules are still conditional in logical form, but they identify entailments among
concepts, not implications among unanalyzed propositions. Such rules tend to exhibit the logical
property of “locality” – that is, the truth-value of the conclusion is determined by the truth-values of
a specifiable set of conditions.33 Concept-based entailments can play a useful role in warranting
inferences between propositions in different branches of the same implication tree, or between
propositions within different implication trees. They only supplement the strategic work of an
implication tree, however, which is designed to capture all of the legal rules that are oriented toward
proving a particular ultimate conclusion.
Using implication trees and concept-based entailments to model legal rules can help achieve
the epistemic objective.34 Such models can make transparent the exact rules that are in play, and
identify with precision the triggering conditions for those rules. Such transparent precision allows
criticism and refinement of those rules, as well as consistency of application, predictability of
outcome for potentially affected parties, and reviewability by other legal institutions. These formal
models can also suggest optimal proof strategies for those parties producing evidence. In addition,
as Part II of this article will discuss, the models can help factfinders to identify relevant evidence,
organize it, and evaluate its probative value. Part II demonstrates how legal rules turn the available
evidence into warrant for drawing the ultimate conclusions. By providing a standardized method of
modeling rules, the default-logic paradigm enables more effective comparisons between different
legal rule-structures, and may suggest more efficient designs. Finally, as the default-logic paradigm
successfully models the structure of legal reasoning and factfinding, it allows the automation of
those models – and therefore the automation of important parts of legal reasoning.

For examples of semantic theories using a rule-based approach to specifying truth-conditions for the
meaningful use of ordinary words, see, e.g., LARSON & SEGAL, supra note 5, at 25-42 (adopting the
approach of studying knowledge of word meaning by developing deductive theories about truth
conditions for ordinary sentences); CHIERCHIA & MCCONNELL-GINET, supra note 5, at 73-81 (setting the
goal of providing “a fully explicit, that is, fully formalized, specification of truth conditions for sentences”
having propositional structures); SAEED, supra note 5, at 292-341 (exploring a formal semantics in which
“the listener who understands the sentence is able to determine the truth conditions of the uttered
sentence, that is, know what conditions in the world would make the sentence true”).
33

See RUSSELL & NORVIG, supra note 6, at 230, 524 (discussing locality as a desirable property of
logical rule-based systems).
34

This article does not discuss how to craft the appropriate default-logic model for capturing a
particular piece of legal reasoning. The art of logical modeling tries to elucidate the warrant and formalize
the legal reasoning that appears in particular statutes, regulations, administrative adjudications, and
judicial decisions.
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B.

Policy-Based Reasoning about Implication Trees

Legal rules provide the deductive structure for legal reasoning, but they are also the subject
matter of legal reasoning about their justification. The justification for adopting or not adopting
particular legal rules generally takes the form of policy-based reasoning. In the default-logic
framework, policies are not constituent elements within implication trees, but rather guide the
decisional process of constructing implication trees.35 Moreover, legal policies are often diverse and
competing: epistemic policies are primarily designed to achieve the epistemic objective (producing
accurate findings warranted by the legally available evidence), while non-epistemic policies
primarily pursue such objectives as procedural fairness and administrative efficiency.36 Therefore,
the modeling of policy-based reasoning within the default-logic paradigm poses two major
problems. The first is how to model the content of the reasoning that connects a particular policy
objective to any particular rule. The second problem is how to balance many lines of such
reasoning, oriented toward diverse policy objectives, into a single justification for a particular rule.
This article does not present a formal model for policy-based reasoning. A promising
approach, however, is one analogous to the model for evaluating evidence to arrive at a warranted
finding of fact – a model that Part II addresses in detail. Just as there are default-logic structures for
organizing and weighing relevant evidence, there may be analogous structures for organizing and
balancing policy rationales.37 Moreover, the success of the default-logic paradigm in modeling legal
process rules (the topic of Part III of this article) gives additional reason to think that the paradigm
can also clarify policy-based reasoning. The formal adoption of a legal rule is itself a kind of
governmental action that requires justification, and there are several areas where reasoning about
rule justification can be studied. Administrative rulemaking is an example of rule adoption, and its

35

Policy-based reasoning is therefore “second-order reasoning.” It is reasoning about whether to adopt
the legal rules that, if adopted, can be modeled within implication trees.
36

Vern R. Walker, Epistemic and Non-epistemic Aspects of the Factfinding Process in Law, APA
NEWSLETTER 03, no. 1, 132, 132 (Fall 2003) (arguing that “any factfinding process in a governmental
institution is designed to balance the epistemic objective against relevant non-epistemic objectives”). The
importance or priority placed on achieving the epistemic objective, in competition with various nonepistemic objectives, might vary from one area of law to another, and from one policy objective to
another. It would be difficult, however, to imagine an area of law in which the epistemic objective had no
importance whatsoever.
37

For example, if there are definitions and measures of efficiency, then a policy argument about
whether a particular rule will or will not increase efficiency can become an empirical question. See, e.g.,
EDITH STOKEY & RICHARD ZECKHAUSER, A PRIMER FOR POLICY ANALYSIS 134-58, 291-319 (1978)
(discussing benefit-cost analysis and market efficiency).
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warrant consists of applying both process and substantive rules to particular issues.38 Statutory
interpretation is another example of explicit rule adoption, in which courts elaborate new rules out
of statutory language, and the judicial canons of interpretation provide examples of policy-based
reasoning.39 Finally, common-law courts create new legal rules in the process of explaining their
judgments, and many courts have reasoned at length about how they balance policy rationales.40
Research on such examples of policy-based reasoning, using the tools developed within the defaultlogic paradigm, should be able to clarify formally the interplay among rule application, rule
adoption, and evidence evaluation.
Policies are particularly important in analyzing principled changes in legal rules or
implication trees. The goal of a “synchronic” logic model is to capture all of the rule-based
deductions that are acceptable at a single point in time. A complete implication tree should capture
all of the applicable legal rules that are relevant to proving the ultimate conclusion of the tree at that
point in time. It is also possible, however, to model how legal rules and implication trees change
over time. This furnishes a “diachronic” model of legal reasoning. Legislatures and regulatory
agencies might adopt new rules, or amend or rescind old ones. Courts might adopt new
interpretations of statutory provisions, or adopt new common-law rules or overrule prior cases.
Policies not only justify new rule adoption, but they also help explain the course of past rule change.
The default-logic paradigm provides synchronic models of rule systems at different times, and
therefore allows a precise picture of how implication trees change over time. Although diachronic
models of legal rule systems can become quite complex, they allow research into the policy-driven
aspect of that change. As Part II explores the default logic of evidence evaluation, it also suggests
methods for evaluating the policy-based arguments behind rule change.

38

E.g., Community Nutrition Institute v. Young, 773 F.2d 1356, 1357-60, 1362-67 (D.C.Cir. 1985),
cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1123 (1986) (reviewing a final rule issued by the Food and Drug Administration
approving the artificial sweetener aspartame for use in liquids, under the process and substantive rules of
the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 348).
39

For leading cases on interpreting statutes administered by federal agencies, see Chevron, U.S.A.,
Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-45 (1984) (establishing rules for a
two-step process of interpretation); Whitman v. American Trucking Associations, Inc., 531 U.S. 457,
462-71 (2001) (holding that § 109(b) of the Clean Air Act “unambiguously bars cost considerations” from
the process of setting national ambient air quality standards).
40

E.g., Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 73 N.Y.2d 487 (1989) (establishing a market share doctrine for
DES cases).
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II.

EVIDENCE EVALUATION AND PLAUSIBILITY SCHEMAS

The default-logic paradigm addresses a major flaw of the traditional approach to legal
reasoning by modeling rule-based deductions and evidence evaluation as parts of a single
continuum. Within the paradigm, factfinding is the process of “attaching” relevant evidence to a
terminal proposition of a legal implication tree, evaluating the probative value of that evidence, and
using that evaluation to assign a truth-value to the terminal proposition. Legal reasoning therefore
has two major components: rule-based deduction within the implication tree, and the evaluation of
evidence attached to the implication tree.41 Part I of this article examined rule-based, three-valued
deductions, modeled by implication trees and concept-based entailments among subjects and
predicates. Part II extends the default-logic model to evidence evaluation by formalizing patterns of
reasoning in which propositions are plausible, and therefore presumptive, but defeasible.42 Part III
will examine process rules in law, using the logic models developed in Parts I and II.
41

The traditional taxonomic divisions of logic (deduction, induction, and abduction) are not
particularly useful in the default-logic paradigm. While deduction occurs within the rule-based portion of
an implication tree, the tree itself is embedded in a broader reasoning context that includes both inductive
and abductive aspects. See WALTON, supra note 7, at 42-3 (stating that in his treatment “presumptive
reasoning is neither deductive nor inductive in nature, but represents a third distinct type of reasoning of
the kind classified by Rescher (1976) as plausible reasoning, an inherently tentative kind of reasoning
subject to defeat by the special circumstances (not defined inductively or statistically) of a particular
case”) (citing N. RESCHER, PLAUSIBLE REASONING (1976)).
Wigmore apparently regarded induction as an inference from an evidentiary assertion about a
particular individual to a conclusion about that same individual, while he regarded deduction as
supporting the same conclusion syllogistically, using an “implied law or generalization” as a major
premise. See JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, THE SCIENCE OF JUDICIAL PROOF §§ 9-10 (1937), reprinted in
ANDERSON & TWINING, supra note 2, at 63-66 (asserting that the form of inference in court is usually
inductive, but that “every inductive inference is at least capable of being transmuted into and stated in the
deductive form, by forcing into prominence the implied law or generalization on which it rests”). For a
discussion of terminological confusion surrounding induction and abduction, see, e.g., John R. Josephson
& Michael C. Tanner, Conceptual Analysis of Abduction, in ABDUCTIVE INFERENCE 5-30 (John R.
Josephson & Susan G. Josephson eds. 1996).
42

For other approaches to evidence evaluation, see generally ANDERSON & TWINING, supra note 2, at
105-72, 329-84 (discussing and extending Wigmore’s methods of evidence evaluation); KADANE &
SCHUM, supra note 25, at 116-75 (discussing the use of Bayes’ Theorem and likelihood ratios to grade the
“probative force of evidence”); SCHUM, supra note 25, at 200-69 (discussing various methods for grading
the “force of evidence” and “evidential support”).
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A.

The Plausibility of Evidence as Warrant

In general, the task of the factfinder is to determine the truth-values of the terminal
propositions of an implication tree by evaluating the relevant portion of the available evidence.43
The terminal propositions of an implication tree are the lowest propositions in every branch of the
tree, and they represent all of the possible findings that are relevant to proving or disproving the
ultimate issue at the top of the tree. Relevance is a logical relationship between evidentiary
propositions and a terminal proposition in an implication tree.44 A particular evidentiary proposition
is relevant if, but only if, a reasonable factfinder would rely upon it in determining the truth-value of
a terminal proposition.45 The problem for logical theory is modeling the probative value or weight
of individual evidentiary propositions, formally combining such values into a single probative value
for the totality of relevant evidence, and determining the truth-value of a terminal proposition as a
function of that probative value.
1.

Plausibility-Values of Evidentiary Propositions

While propositions in an implication tree have a three-valued truth-value, evidentiary
propositions are assigned a “plausibility-value.”46 Evidentiary propositions include assertions made
43

In practice, the truth-value may also be established by stipulation of the parties, or may be decided
“as a matter of law” by a court ruling on a motion.
44

Federal Rule of Evidence 401 defines “relevant evidence” as “evidence having any tendency to
make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or
less probable than it would be without the evidence.”
45

If legal factfinding has the epistemic goal of producing knowledge, in the sense of “warranted true
belief,” then the notion of a proposition’s being “probably true” reflects the degree to which a reasonable
factfinder is warranted, on the basis of the evidence that is legally available, in believing that the
proposition accurately describes its subject. See Vern R. Walker, Preponderance, Probability, and
Warranted Factfinding, 62 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW 1075, 1079-97 (1996). Usually, such a reasonable
belief is only presumptively valid, and is defeasible if new evidence or a re-analysis of old evidence
warrants a change in the belief.
46

See WALTON, supra note 1, at 103-50 (distinguishing plausibility from probability, and discussing
the history of the concept of plausibility). For a discussion of plausibility as a useful concept for
evaluating evidence and weighing hypotheses, see John R. Josephson, Plausibility, in ABDUCTIVE
INFERENCE, supra note 41, at 266-72 (arguing that “coarse-scale” measures of plausibility seem to be “all
we can usually get from experience” and are “almost always sufficient to decide action,” while little may
be gained by interpreting plausibility as mathematical probability, and it may be misleading to do so).
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by witnesses, descriptions of things entered into evidence, or other relevant descriptions (such as
descriptions of a witness’s demeanor). A plausibility-value is the classification on a scale of
plausibility that a factfinder assigns to an evidentiary proposition.47 A scale of plausibility can have
any number of possible values, and can be either qualitative or quantitative.48 For example, a
plausibility scale might be qualitative, ordinal, and have five values (such as “true / probably true /
undecided / probably false / false”) or seven values (such as “almost certainly true / highly likely /
probably true / undecided / probably false / highly unlikely / almost certainly false”).49 By contrast,
an infinite-valued quantitative scale is conventional mathematical probability, using the set of real
numbers between zero and one, and having values such as 0.56.50 A reasonable factfinder would
select a plausibility scale that is suitable to the circumstances, and would assign to evidentiary
propositions plausibility-values on that scale.

47

On measurement or classification generally, see Vern R. Walker, The Siren Songs of Science:
Toward a Taxonomy of Scientific Uncertainty for Decisionmakers, 23 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW 567,
580-88 (1991).
48

Cf. John Henry Wigmore, The Problem of Proof, 8 ILL. L. REV. 77 (1913), reprinted in ANDERSON
& TWINING, supra note 2, at 108-17 (grading the “probative effect of an evidential fact” as “provisional
credit” and “strong credit,” while grading the supported conclusion as “believ[ed] … to be a fact” and
“particularly strong belief”).
49

See Josephson, supra note 46, at 266-67 (stating that a “seven-step scale” using such values as “very
likely” and “ruled out” was used in designing a medical diagnostic system, because “all available
evidence supported the view that seven confidence grades are more than sufficient to represent physician
reasoning during diagnosis”). In empirical studies of human risk perception, researchers measure the
perceived risk of hazards using scales with a small number of classification categories. See, e.g., Paul
Slovic et al., Evaluating Chemical Risks: Results of a Survey of the British Toxicology Society, 16 HUM.
& EXPERIMENTAL TOXICOLOGY 289, 290 & fig. 1 (1997) (using the categories “almost no health risk,”
“slight health risk,” “moderate health risk,” “high health risk,” and “don’t know”); Michael Siegrist &
George Cvetkovich, Perception of Hazards: The Role of Social Trust and Knowledge, 20 RISK ANALYSIS
713, 715 (2000) (using a 7-point scale ranging from “not at all risky” to “very risky”); Michael A.
Diefenbach et al., Scales for Assessing Perceptions of Health Hazard Susceptibility, 8 HEALTH EDUC.
RES. 181, 188-89 (1993) (finding that in measuring susceptibility or likelihood of harm, a 7-point verbal
category scale performs at least as well as a 100-point numerical scale).
50

See L. JONATHAN COHEN, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF INDUCTION AND
PROBABILITY 70-74 (1989). For an introduction to mathematical probability within the context of legal
reasoning, see, e.g., Philip Dawid, Probability and Proof: Some Basic Concepts, Appendix in ANDERSON
& TWINING, supra note 2, at 389-441.
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The decision about which plausibility scale to employ should balance non-epistemic and
epistemic objectives.51 An important non-epistemic consideration is the pragmatic context for the
factfinding.52 If the legal decision-making does not require a high level of precision in evaluating
plausibility, then there may be no reason for using a scale with a large number of values. Moreover,
from an epistemic standpoint, using an ordinal, qualitative scale with a small number of values often
reduces the potential for classification error, especially when the concepts in the evidentiary
proposition are themselves qualitative. Inconsistency in classification is good evidence of the
existence of error.53 Scientists often manage to employ very precise, quantitative plausibility scales,
yet achieve acceptable consistency of results, when the subject-matter lends itself to quantitative
measurements, researchers refine and test precise measurement instruments, and they train
investigators to achieve reliable and valid measurements with those instruments. But ordinarylanguage concepts are often “fuzzy,” or vague in their application,54 and highly quantitative
51

Cf. Vern R. Walker, Restoring the Individual Plaintiff to Tort Law by Rejecting “Junk Logic” About
Specific Causation, 56 ALABAMA LAW REVIEW 381, 389-95 (2004) (arguing that within a legal context,
decisions about what levels of precision and accuracy are acceptable are inherently pragmatic).
52

See, e.g., Josephson & Tanner, supra note 41, at 14 (stating that in abductive reasoning, besides the
“judgment of likelihood” [plausibility] associated with the conclusion, the “willingness to accept the
conclusion should (and typically does) depend on: … pragmatic considerations, including the costs of
being wrong and the benefits of being right,” as well as “how strong the need is to come to a conclusion at
all”).
53

The potential for classification error can be divided into two important categories: the potential for
random error (making the classifications “unreliable”) and the potential for systematic error or bias
(making the classifications “invalid”). For discussions of the concepts of reliability and validity in
science, see generally EDWARD G. CARMINES & RICHARD A. ZELLER, RELIABILITY AND VALIDITY
ASSESSMENT 11-13, 29-51 (1979); DAVID FREEDMAN, ROBERT PISANI, ROGER PURVES, & ANI
ADHIKARI, STATISTICS 90-101, 395-411 (2d ed. 1991); EDWIN E. GHISELLI, JOHN P. CAMPBELL, &
SHELDON ZEDECK, MEASUREMENT THEORY FOR THE BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 184, 191, 266 (1981);
HERMAN J. LOETHER & DONALD G. MCTAVISH, DESCRIPTIVE AND INFERENTIAL STATISTICS: AN
INTRODUCTION 15, 34 (4th ed. 1993); Robert M. Groves, Measurement Error Across the Disciplines, in
MEASUREMENT ERRORS IN SURVEYS 1-25 (Paul P. Biemer et al. eds. 1991); David H. Kaye & David A.
Freedman, Reference Guide on Statistics, in REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 83, 102-04
(Federal Judicial Center, 2d ed. 2000); Walker, supra note 51, at 389-95. The reliability of a classification
process for plausibility would characterize the random variability in results when the same factfinder
repeatedly classifies the same asserted proposition. Reliability is a measure of same-evaluator
inconsistency. The validity of a classification process for plausibility would characterize the systematic
divergence when two different factfinders or evaluators classify the same asserted proposition. Validity
measures inter-evaluator inconsistency. Both reliability and validity are generally matters of degree, and
this is particularly so as the number of possible values in the plausibility scale increases.
54

See SCHUM, supra note 25, at 261-69; CHIERCHIA & MCCONNELL-GINET, supra note 5, at 482-89.
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plausibility scales would yield inconsistent evaluations. Moreover, ordinary legal factfinders, who
are usually untrained in scientific measurement, must assign degrees of plausibility to the everyday
assertions of lay witnesses. Legal rules therefore seldom require factfinders to employ any particular
plausibility scale when evaluating evidence. Generally, the factfinder is free to utilize any
plausibility scale, so long as the factfinder is able to apply the appropriate standard of proof in
making the findings or verdicts.55 The epistemic objective is better served, however, when the
plausibility scale produces the level of precision and the potential for error that are acceptable under
the circumstances.56
2.

Plausibility Schemas

“Plausibility schemas”57 are patterns of evidentiary propositions that use the plausibilityvalues of evidentiary propositions to assign a truth-value to the terminal proposition.58 They are
55

The process rules about standard of proof are discussed infra text accompanying notes 132-34.

56

There is usually a cost associated with increasing precision without increasing the potential for error,
or with decreasing the potential for error while retaining the same degree of precision. In a defaultreasoning context, there is always more evidence to be obtained or there are always more ways to
evaluate the available evidence. Such costs must be weighed against the possible benefits involved in
producing more accurate conclusions, more warranted decisions, and more justified actions.
57

The word “schema” refers to a linguistic pattern that contains variables, together with a rule for
replacing linguistic elements for those variables, so that one can use the schema to generate an indefinite
number of instances. In logic, schemas are used to specify sets of permissible axioms or inferences. See
GERALD J. MASSEY, UNDERSTANDING SYMBOLIC LOGIC 139-40, 147-48 (1970); JOHN M. ANDERSON &
HENRY W. JOHNSTONE, JR., NATURAL DEDUCTION: THE LOGICAL BASIS OF AXIOM SYSTEMS 20-21
(1962). In semantics, schemas are used to specify conditions for assigning a truth-value to a sentence, see,
e.g., SAEED, supra note 5, at 89, 305-09, or more generally, to organize cognitive domains such as
language, see id. at 353-57. In the field of artificial intelligence, the concept of a schema is often
generalized to the concept of a “model” or “possible world” used to define when a sentence is true, see,
e.g., RUSSELL & NORVIG, supra note 6, at 201, but the notion of a schema also finds more particular uses,
e.g., id. at 118-19 (describing schemas in genetic search algorithms), 809 (describing rules schemas in
augmented grammars).
58

The same evidentiary assertion could be relevant to (attach to) many different terminal propositions.
The plausibility-value of any particular evidence assertion must remain the same (be invariant), regardless
of where the evidence is relevant in the tree. Plausibility reflects the evaluation of that evidence assertion
relative to the support for it. By contrast, the degree of marginal support that an evidentiary assertion can
provide to a terminal proposition, given the other available evidence relevant to that proposition, can vary
from leaf node to leaf node. The same piece of testimony, possessing the same plausibility, can be highly
probative for proving one terminal proposition, but only slightly probative for proving some other
terminal proposition. Cf. WALTON, supra note 1, at 294 (stating that an “argument is evaluated on the
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inference schemas that explain why the plausibility of the evidence warrants reasoning up the
implication tree.59 Like rule-based deductions, plausibility schemas have an inverted tree structure.
One set of logical connectives bridging the levels of a schema consists of generalized functions of
the three truth-value connectives used in implication trees.60 These plausibility connectives
determine the plausibility-value of the conclusion on the upper level as a function of the plausibilityvalues of the evidentiary propositions on the lower level. The “AND” plausibility connective
assigns to the conclusion the lowest plausibility-value possessed by any of its conjuncts.61 The
“OR” plausibility connective assigns to the conclusion the highest value of any of its disjuncts.62 If
factfinders are free to adopt different plausibility scales for different evidentiary propositions,63 then
these plausibility functions will require a rule for handling a mixture of scales – for example, where
basis of (a) how plausible the premises are, and (b) how strong is the inference from the premises to the
conclusion”).
59

A recent literature has developed on “argumentation schemes,” WALTON, supra note 7, at 2-3,
which bear a family resemblance to plausibility schemas as defined here. As Walton uses the phrase, an
argumentation scheme is “presumptive and plausibilistic in nature,” supporting a conclusion that is “a
reasonable presumption.” Id. at 13. However, “[d]rawing conclusions from premises using these
argumentation schemes is a kind of presumptive guesswork” because “the basis of their support is
subjective” and “attaching some numerical values, truth-values, or whatever, to the propositions is not, by
itself, much help.” Id. at 13-14. The function of the argumentation scheme is to orchestrate a dialogue by
use of “appropriate critical questions,” the asking of which shifts “a burden or weight of presumptions to
the other side in a dialogue.” Id. at 13-14, 46. While the study of argumentation schemes can therefore
provide valuable information for developing plausibility schemas, the two structures are clearly not
identical.
60

Defining the three-valued truth connectives as special cases of the many-valued plausibility
connectives creates an important feature of the default-logic paradigm: the patterns of deductive
reasoning within the rule-based implication tree exhibit the same connective logic as the patterns of
reasoning within the generalization-based plausibility schemas.
61

Within many-valued logic, Łukasiewicz and Gödel studied this conjunction connective formally.
See GOTTWALD, supra note 3, at 65-66. This definition of the connective function is independent of “the
number of truth degrees of the particular system of many-valued logic they belong to.” Id. See WALTON,
supra note 1, at 109-13 (contrasting “linked arguments,” in which “the conclusion should be at least as
plausible as the least plausible premise” – the “least plausible premise rule” – with “convergent
arguments,” for which he thinks the least plausible premise rule does not work).
62

For a formal definition of this many-valued disjunction connective, see GOTTWALD, supra note 3, at

63

See supra text accompanying notes 48-56.

90.
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one conjunct or disjunct has a plausibility-value on a seven-point ordinal scale and another conjunct
or disjunct has a quantitative value on a real-number scale. These connectives require knowing only
whether a particular value on one scale is lower (for conjunction) or higher (for disjunction) than a
value on another scale. Then the conclusion can be evaluated on a scale appropriate to its content,
context, and support, but the scale could be as precise as the scale of the decisive evidentiary
proposition – the one with the lowest plausibility-value (for conjunction) or the highest plausibilityvalue (for disjunction).
In the case of plausibility defeater, the “UNLESS” plausibility connective, if the defeater
proposition is plausible, then this connective assigns to the conclusion a degree of plausibility
inverse to that of the defeater proposition.64 That is, as the plausibility of the defeater proposition
increases, the plausibility of the conclusion decreases (alternatively, the implausibility of the
conclusion increases). Some examples: on the five-point scale above, if the plausibility-value of the
defeater is “probably true,” then the plausibility-value of the conclusion is “probably false”; on the
seven-point scale above, if the defeater is “highly likely,” then the conclusion is “highly unlikely”;
on the scale of mathematical probability, if the defeater’s plausibility-vaue is 0.56, then the
conclusion’s plausibility-value is 0.44 (1 – 0.56).65
Like truth-functional connectives, therefore, these plausibility connectives determine the
conclusion’s plausibility-value entirely as a function of the plausibility-values of the schema’s
evidentiary propositions. This is a desirable property from both a theoretical and an automation
standpoint. The derivation of the inferential value is completely transparent and formal. Moreovoer,
software can determine the plausibility-value of the conclusion of a plausibility schema entirely
from the plausibility-values at lower levels of the schema.
Section II.B infra provides several illustrations of plausibility schemas. Formally, however,
a plausibility schema is an inference tree, such as the following:66
64

Logicians have also studied a weaker kind of defeater connective that may prove useful in
plausibility schemas. E.g., BREWKA ET AL., supra note 4, at 2-3, 16 (explaining a Type II defeater as
“undermin[ing] the justification for a default without contradicting its conclusion; the conclusion may still
hold, but we cannot use the default to justify it”); POLLOCK, supra note 7, at 79 (distinguishing “rebutting
defeaters” that warrant the falsehood of the conclusion from “undercutting defeaters” that “attack the
connection between the prima facie reason and its conclusion rather than attacking the conclusion itself”).
From a formal standpoint, a many-valued defeater combines the functions of a many-valued
conjunction (“AND”) and a many-valued negation (“NOT”) into a single connective (“AND-NOT”). For
formal definitions of many-valued negation connectives, see GOTTWALD, supra note 3, at 84-85.
65
66

For the calculus of mathematical probability, see supra note 50.

In the plausibility region of a logic diagram, the proposition shape has a dashed line around it
instead of a solid line, to indicate that the proposition takes a plausibility-value instead of a truth-value. In
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The interpretation of such a schema is that if the evidentiary propositions on the lower level are
plausible, then the conclusion is also plausible (or implausible) in the manner determined by the
plausibility connective. Plausibility schemas model default reasoning to conclusions that are
presumptively plausible or implausible, but defeasible.
Because plausibility schemas supply the warrant for a default inference to a presumptively
true conclusion, a major strategy for designing a plausibility schema is to develop a “theory of
uncertainty” for the type of inference.67 When the available evidence is incomplete, a good theory of
uncertainty can warrant drawing a presumptive but defeasible conclusion precisely because the
factfinder understands what evidence is missing, why the missing evidence is relevant, but also why

addition, the arrows connecting evidentiary propositions within a plausibility schema are dashed instead
of solid, to indicate that the inference it represents operates plausibilistically (has “degrees of support”),
instead of being the three-valued inference of an implication tree. The entire model of the complete
reasoning is therefore an “inference tree,” which includes both rule-based deductions and plausibility
evaluations.
67

For the concept of a “theory of uncertainty” generally, see Vern R. Walker, Theories of Uncertainty:
Explaining the Possible Sources of Error in Inferences, 22 CARDOZO LAW REVIEW 1523, 1525, 1538-41
(2001) (suggesting that “theories of uncertainty have an explanatory function in inference that is roughly
parallel to the role played by theories of causation in the empirical sciences”).
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it is nevertheless reasonable to make a finding without that missing evidence.68 A theory of
uncertainty explains how the available evidence could be plausible but the conclusion could still be
false (or in the case of defeater, how the conclusion could still be true). It identifies the possible
sources of error in a type of inference, and explains how that error can come about.69 A theory of
uncertainty therefore helps a factfinder to identify the sources, types, and degrees of uncertainty
associated with drawing the conclusion,70 and can suggest strategies for obtaining new evidence.71
Theories of uncertainty, incorporated into the inference structures of plausibility schemas, therefore
play a critical role in default reasoning. Just as epistemic policies play a role in justifying the
adoption of particular legal rules, theories of uncertainty supply the epistemic justification for
adopting particular plausibility schemas as constituting warrant for default factfinding.
A common component of most (if not all) plausibility schemas is a generalization, and the
presumptive force of the schema depends in large part on the plausibility of that generalization.72 A

68

See, e.g., Josephson & Tanner, supra note 41, at 15 (stating that when an abductive justification is
challenged, a proper answer is in terms of “what is wrong with alternative explanations and what is the
evidence that all plausible explanations have been considered”).
69

Theories of uncertainty often consider three broad sources of error: linguistic, logical, and causal.
Walker, supra note 67, at 1532-38. Error might arise because the factfinder misunderstands the meanings
of the words used (the linguistic dimension), the logical relationships among the propositions asserted
(the logical dimension), or the causal relationships among the objects or events involved (the causal
dimension).
70

Id. at 1525-26, 1538-43.

71

Id. at 1526.

72

For general discussions of the role of generalizations within legal reasoning, see ANDERSON &
TWINING, supra note 2, at 63-69, 367-79; SCHUM, supra note 25, at 81-83, 101-02, 109-12, 209-10, 26169, 472; WALTON, supra note 7, at 46, 51-53, 151-54. Some logical theorists have treated generalizations,
as defined here, as being a species of propositions that they call “warrants.” See, e.g., STEPHEN TOULMIN,
THE USES OF ARGUMENT 97-107 (1958) (giving the example of a possible warrant as “A Swede can be
taken almost certainly not to be a Roman Catholic”); TOULMIN ET AL., supra note 7, at 45-59, 219-29
(discussing generalizations based on samples or signs and causal generalizations as kinds of backing for
warrants).
The logical structure of warrant for a direct inference is distinct from the cognitive process of
producing possible generalizations on which to base a direct inference. For one analysis of the latter
process, see, e.g., JEROME P. KASSIRER & RICHARD I. KOPELMAN, LEARNING CLINICAL REASONING 2-46
(1991) (analyzing the process of generating, refining, and verifying medical hypotheses for diagnosing
diseases of specific patients in a clinical setting).
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generalization usually asserts that a description is true in some situations but not all situations.73
When a generalization is analyzed into its logical predicate and one or more indefinite subjects,74 it
asserts that the predicate accurately describes some portion of the subject class.75 Examples of
generalizations are: “most witnesses testifying under oath tell the truth,” “one-third of Americans
are overweight,” and “60% of the test group in the study developed the disease.” These
generalizations have the following logical forms (respectively): “most As are Bs,” “X/Y of As are
Bs,” and “X% of the members of group A are (also) members of group B.” In these propositions,
logicians call group A the “reference class” or “reference group” for the generalization.76 The
content of a generalization includes an asserted degree of “quantification” over the reference class –
73

Logicians often call propositions asserted to be true about all members of a group “generalizations,”
e.g., COPI & COHEN, supra note 13, at 431-32, but less-than-universal generalizations are far more
common in assessing plausibility of evidence.
74

Logical subjects are divided into definite and indefinite subjects. See, e.g., RODES & POSPESEL,
supra note 15, at 114-20 (discussing “singular terms” and “general terms”); LARSON & SEGAL, supra
note 5, at 286-301, 319-59 (discussing the “definiteness effect” and “definite descriptions” within
semantic theory); CHIERCHIA & MCCONNELL-GINET, supra note 5, at 55-68, 105-08 (discussing, within
semantic theory, the concepts of proper names and definite descriptions, as contrasted with general terms
and common nouns). Definite subjects are specific individuals that are denoted by proper names (“John
Jones”) or by definite descriptions (“the plaintiff in Civil Case No. 2006-234”), or by pronouns taking
their denotations from proper names or definite descriptions. Indefinite subjects are individuals that are
identified entirely by their general characteristics. Indefinite subjects can be denoted by common nouns
(“plaintiffs”), indefinite descriptions (“a party to a lawsuit”), and other grammatical phrases that name
groups or classes of individuals. In ordinary language, the same phrase might be used to name either a
definite subject or an indefinite subject (e.g., “a justice of the United States Supreme Court”), depending
upon whether the speaker intends to name a specific individual or merely an indefinite member of a class
or group.
75

This concept of “generalization” is that employed by logicians. See, e.g., COPI & COHEN, supra note
13, at 431-32; CHIERCHIA & MCCONNELL-GINET, supra note 5, at 113-17; RODES & POSPESEL, supra
note 15, at 119-20. This concept is very close to that employed by Wigmore, Anderson, and Twining, see
ANDERSON & TWINING, supra note 2, at 43-44, 63-69, 367-84 (giving numerous examples of
generalizations), and at least consistent with the hypothetical concept of generalization employed by
Toulmin and Schum, see TOULMIN, supra note 72, at 98 (calling “general, hypothetical statements” that
authorize inferences “warrants”); SCHUM, supra note 25, at 81-82 (calling generalizations “assertions
about what happens in general,” intended to state “why we believe we are entitled to reason from one
stage to another”). The more formal concept of generalization employed by logicians and in the defaultlogic paradigm is more conducive to capture in artificial intelligence software.
76

See, e.g., HENRY E. KYBURG, JR., SCIENCE & REASON 41 (1990); BRIAN SKYRMS, CHOICE AND
CHANCE: AN INTRODUCTION TO INDUCTIVE LOGIC 201 (2d ed. 1975).
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that is, the size of the portion of A that is asserted to be B.77 Moreover, a generalization often
contains an explicit modal “hedge” qualifying the entire assertion, which can influence the
plausibility-value compared to an unhedged generalization.78 Examples of modal hedges are
expressions of frequency (e.g., “sometimes” or “often”), typicality (e.g., “typically” or “normally”),
temporal limitation (e.g., “in the past” or “at least for the immediate future”), or degree of
confidence of the speaker (e.g., “perhaps” or “almost certainly”).79 The degree of quantification
asserted and the modal hedge employed change the content of the generalization, and therefore can
influence its plausibility. As Part II.B of this article illustrates, these attributes of generalizations can
influence in turn the degree of warrant that a plausibility schema provides for a conclusion.
3.

Findings of Fact

The purpose of using a plausibility schema is to warrant a finding that a terminal proposition
is either true or false. The function of a schema is to organize the relevant evidence in such a way
that the presumptive nature of the reasoning becomes transparent. Primary factors in selecting a
schema to use for a particular terminal proposition are therefore the logical form of the terminal
proposition and the nature of the available evidence. For example, whether the terminal proposition
is a generalization about groups or a proposition about a specific individual will determine what
kind of schema is needed. And evidence that is scientific and statistical should be organized
differently than eyewitness testimony. While this article cannot present a complete catalog of
possible plausibility schemas, or explore their properties in a formal way, it does provide an
extended illustration focusing on one type of important terminal proposition (in Section II.B infra).

77

Traditional predicate logic has studied extensively the formal properties of two important
quantifiers: the universal quantifier (“all As …”) and the existential quantifier (“some As …” or “at least
one A …”). E.g., COPI & COHEN, supra note 13, at 431-59; RODES & POSPESEL, supra note 15, at 124-34;
SAINSBURY, supra note 13, at 141-47, 182-90.
78

See SCHUM, supra note 25, at 81-83, 101-02, 110-12 (giving as examples of “hedges” the adverbs
“sometimes,” “frequently,” “often,” and “usually”); TOULMIN, supra note 72, at 100-01, 108-13
(discussing “modal qualifiers,” such as “presumably” and “almost certainly,” as “indicating the strength
conferred by the warrant” on an inference from evidence to conclusion). It is not always clear in legal
writings, however, whether the hedge term is about frequency (how often the asserted description is true),
fuzzy set membership (how definitively individuals can be placed in a class or given a description),
degree of warrant (how good the evidential support is), or subjective confidence (how convinced the
speaker is). See Walker, supra note 67, at 1560-62.
79

See Josephson & Tanner, supra note 41, at 22-23; SCHUM, supra note 25, at 81-82; TOULMIN, supra
note 72, at 100-02 (discussing “modal qualifiers” like “presumably” as expressing a “degree of force”).
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Plausibility schemas are not implication trees, and attaching schematized evidence to an
implication tree does not extend that tree. First, as noted above, the evidentiary propositions within a
plausibility schema have plausibility-values on variable scales of plausibility, not truth-values on a
three-valued scale. Moreover, the factfinder selects schemas and plausibility scales to fit the
evidence in the particular case, whereas authoritative institutions adopt the legal rules modeled by
the implication tree. This means that the schematized evidence is specific to the particular case and
factfinder, whereas the implication tree is generic to all cases within the legal jurisdiction. There are
many plausibility schemas that might warrant a particular terminal proposition, depending upon the
nature and probative value of the available evidence. The fact that one line of evidentiary reasoning
provides sufficient warrant in a particular case does not mean that no other line of reasoning could
warrant that finding as well, or that no other reasoning would provide stronger warrant. An entire
“inference tree,” composed of an implication tree at the top and schemas of evidence attached to
terminal propositions toward the bottom, models the entire legal reasoning in the particular case –
which includes rules, policies, findings, and evidentiary bases for those findings.
In order for plausibility schemas to provide a transparent and principled inference from
plausible evidence to a finding, there must be a rule for determining the truth-value of a terminal
proposition as a function of the plausibility-value of the evidence relevant to that proposition. In
legal terminology, this rule is the applicable “standard of proof.”80 For example, the standard of
proof for most issues of fact in civil cases is preponderance of the evidence.81 Under this rule, if the
factfinder evaluates the relevant evidence as having any plausibility-value other than “undecided,”
then the factfinder must assign the corresponding truth-value to the terminal proposition – that is,
find the terminal proposition to be true if she evaluates the evidence as plausible to any degree, and
find the terminal proposition to be false if she evaluates the evidence as being implausible to any
degree. The use of the preponderance standard of proof in law has a number of policy-based
rationales.82 Part III.B of this article discusses standards of proof generally, as a type of process rule,
but such standards are essential to warranting inferences from evidence that is merely plausible to
80

See JAMES ET AL., supra note 30, §§ 7.5, 7.14 (discussing “the three generally recognized standards
of proof … : preponderance, clear and convincing, and beyond a reasonable doubt”).
81

See id.; 2 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 339 (John W. Strong ed., 4th ed. 1992); J.P. McBaine,
Burden of Proof: Degrees of Belief, 32 CAL. L. REV. 242, 247, 261 (1944).
82

Walker, supra note 45, at 1083-92, 1113-20 (discussing, besides the epistemic objective, three
policy rationales for the preponderance standard of proof: creating an incentive for all parties to produce
an adequate amount of relevant evidence; treating all parties to a proceeding in an unbiased and nearly
equal manner, despite the fact that one party bears the burden of persuasion; and producing findings that
are likely to enjoy a fairly wide scope of agreement, at least among reasonable people weighing the same
evidence).
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rule-based deductions and ultimate conclusions. Standards of proof are the warrant links between
the output of plausibility schemas and the input to the implication trees to which the schemas attach.
B.

Examples of Plausibility Schemas

This section illustrates the use of default logic to evaluate evidence, by briefly considering
three plausibility schemas: the direct-inference schema, the statistical-generalization schema, and
the personal-observation schema. These three schemas can model one type of warrant for a finding
about an unobserved property of a definite subject or specific individual. Examples of such findings
are: “the tire that caused the accident had a manufacturing or design defect,”83 “the defendant was
driving under the influence of marijuana,”84 and “the claimant contracted pneumoconiosis.”85 These
findings are about a specific tire, a specific defendant, and a specific claimant. Such findings would
establish (respectively) the truth of the following terminal propositions within legal implication
trees: “the product [identified in the case] was defective”86; “the person [driving a motor vehicle]
was under the influence of a controlled substance”87; and “the claimant suffers from
pneumoconiosis.”88 The logical problem is modeling the kind of reasoning that can warrant the
plausibility of such findings of fact.89
83

E.g., Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 142-45 (1999) (judicial civil case).

84

E.g., State v. Klawitter, 518 N.W.2d 577, 578 (Minn. 1994) (judicial criminal case).

85

Greenwich Collieries v. Director, Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs, 990 F.2d 730, 731
(3 Cir. 1993), aff’d, 512 U.S. 269 (1994) (administrative case involving judicial review of a decision of
the Benefits Review Board).
rd

86

See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, THIRD: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 1; Carmichael v. Samyung Tires,
Inc., 923 F.Supp. 1514, 1516-17 (S.D.Ala. 1996), rev’d on other grounds, 131 F.3d 1433 (11th Cir. 1997),
rev’d on other grounds sub nom. Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999) (applying the
products liability law of Alabama).
87

See MINN. STATUTES §§ 152.02, 169A.20 (controlled substances; driving while impaired).

88

See Peabody Coal Co. v. Hill, 123 F.3d 412, 415-16 (6th Cir. 1997) (enumerating the factual
elements of a claimant’s prima facie case to establish entitlement to benefits under the Black Lung
Benefits Act).
89

A parallel pattern of reasoning in medicine is “evidence-based medicine” (EBM), in which
physicians evaluate the best available scientific information and apply it to specific patients. D.L. Sackett,
W.M. Rosenberg, J.A.M. Gray, R.B. Haynes & W.S. Richardson, Evidence based medicine: what it is
and what it isn’t, 312 BRITISH MEDICAL JOURNAL 71-72 (1996) (defining EBM as “the conscientious,
explicit, and judicious use of current best evidence in making decisions about the care of individual

Vern R. Walker

June 2006; Page 28

A Default-Logic Paradigm for Legal Reasoning and Factfinding
CONFIDENTIAL DRAFT: PLEASE DO NOT QUOTE OR CITE
There may be several possible patterns of reasoning that could provide the needed warrant,90
but logicians have called the particular pattern discussed here “direct inference.”91 The directinference syllogism has the following form:92
Most things in category A are also in category B.
The definite subject S is in category A.
Therefore, the definite subject S is probably (also) in category B.
A direct-inference schema consists of two premises leading to a conclusion. The first or major
premise is a generalization that asserts that some portion of things in category A are in fact also in
category B.93 The second or minor premise is an assertion that a specific individual or definite
subject (S) is in category A.94 A logic diagram of this direct-inference syllogism is as follows:
patients”); DAN MAYER, ESSENTIAL EVIDENCE-BASED MEDICINE 9-15 (2004) (discussing six steps in the
process of EBM).
90

It is an underlying principle of the default-logic paradigm that empirical research together with
logical analysis might uncover many patterns of sound presumptive reasoning. Theories of uncertainty
could then be the bases for converting them into plausibility schema. This optimism runs counter to the
pessimism of some theorists, e.g., SCHUM, supra note 25, at 472 (concluding that “[t]here is no general
standard according to which we may grade the plausibility of generalizations that we may assert,” and
that “there are no rules showing us which generalizations to invoke as we attempt to link evidence to
hypotheses”).
91

Isaac Levi, Direct Inference, 74 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY 5 (1977); Isaac Levi, Direct
Inference and Confirmational Conditionalization, 48 PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE 532 (1981); Henry E.
Kyburg, Jr., The Reference Class, 50 PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE 374 (1983); POLLOCK, supra note 7,
Chapter 4. Toulmin has referred to direct inferences as “quasi-syllogisms.” See TOULMIN, supra note 72,
at 108-11, 131-34, 139-40.
One type of direct inference is sometimes called “abduction,” when abduction is defined as “inference
to the best explanation,” or as “a process of reasoning from effect to cause” to explain the data in a
specific case. Josephson & Tanner, supra note 41, at 5, 7, 17. However, some authors explicitly exclude
direct inference from the definition of abduction. See id. at 23-24.
92

See Walker, supra note 51, at 386-89 (discussing direct inference in warranting conclusions about
specific causation in tort cases).
93

When the portion of A asserted to be B is identified statistically (using for example a mathematical
proportion or percentage), then logicians often call the generalization a “statistical generalization,” and
the direct-inference pattern a “statistical syllogism.” See, e.g., Josephson & Tanner, supra note 41, at 23;
POLLOCK & CRUZ, supra note 10, at 229-30; WESLEY C. SALMON, LOGIC 87-91 (2d ed. 1973). The
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Because a direct inference uses a generalization about a reference group to warrant inferences about
specific individuals in that group,95 this pattern of reasoning is particularly useful when the
individual’s membership in category B is not directly observed.
While direct-inference reasoning has intuitive appeal, the uncertainties inherent in such
reasoning become clearer by examining each of the two premises. The first or major premise is a
generalization asserting that some portion of the members of reference class A are also in category
B.96 The plausibility of this premise rests in turn upon a plausibility schema for warranting
generalizations. One possible type of evidence is statistical data, and a theory of uncertainty would
explain the potential for error in generalizing from such data. One plausibility schema for
warranting statistical generalizations incorporates two types or sources of uncertainty: measurement
uncertainty and sampling uncertainty. Each type of uncertainty can increase or decrease the
inference is called a “statistical syllogism” because a statistical premise (such as “X percent of As are B”)
is used instead of a universal generalization (“All As are B”). SALMON, supra, at 88-91; POLLOCK, supra
note 7, at 75-77. For early recognition of the difficulty such inferences pose for legal theory, see George
F. James, Relevancy, Probability, and the Law, 29 CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW 689 (1941).
94

Ayer defined a distinct class of judgments that he called “judgements of credibility.” A. J. AYER,
PROBABILITY AND EVIDENCE 27-29, 53-61 (1972). As he said: “the judgement that such and such an
individual smoker will probably die of lung cancer, if it is genuinely a judgement about this individual,
and not just about the class of smokers to which he belongs, is a judgement of credibility.” Id. at 28.
95

For a direct-inference analysis of reasoning to a warranted finding about causation of a specific
plaintiff’s injury in a tort case, see Walker, supra note 51, at 452-60.
96

AL.,

For a general discussion of reasoning involving the backing for generalizations, see TOULMIN ET
supra note 7, at 219-29.

Vern R. Walker

June 2006; Page 30

A Default-Logic Paradigm for Legal Reasoning and Factfinding
CONFIDENTIAL DRAFT: PLEASE DO NOT QUOTE OR CITE
plausibility of the generalization, and therefore each type of uncertainty is modeled as a separate
conjunctive branch in the plausibility schema.97
Within the first branch, the plausibility of the statistical generalization depends upon how
much measurement uncertainty there is in classifying things as being A and being B.98 The asserted
proportion of As that are Bs can be warranted as accurate only if the classifications of individuals
into groups A and B have acceptable accuracy.99 If individuals are misclassified as being A or being
B, then the asserted proportion of As that are Bs will be inaccurate to some extent. Of course, more
plausibility schemas may come into play in warranting that the measurement uncertainties for A and
B are acceptable.100 Unless the data classifying individuals as A and B have acceptable
measurement accuracy, the generalization about As being Bs is itself unwarranted.

97

This plausibility schema for warranting a statistical generalization can be diagrammed as:

98

For discussion and references on measurement or classification uncertainty, see Walker, supra note
51, at 389-95.
99

The degree of precision asserted in the generalization can also affect its plausibility. A
generalization asserting that a precise percentage of As are Bs may require stronger support than a
generalization asserting merely that “most” As are Bs.
100

Measurement uncertainty rests in turn on reliability and validity, each of which can reduce the
plausibility of the generalization. See supra note 53. Reliability describes the degree of variability in
outcome when reclassifying the same subject using the same measurement process. Validity characterizes
the inaccuracy resulting from a measurement process when the results are compared to the results from
another measurement process for the same property or characteristic. Researchers can improve reliability
and validity by different methods – by improving the measurement instruments or measurement process,
or by improving the analysis of the data. See Walker, supra note 51, at 394-95. Moreover, as discussed
above in the context of classifying evidentiary assertions, supra text accompanying notes 51-56, the
degrees of unreliability and invalidity that are acceptable in a particular situation depend upon the
pragmatic purpose for which the inference is being made. Walker, supra note 51, at 395. Acceptable
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Within the second branch, the plausibility of the statistical generalization depends upon
whether the sampling uncertainty is acceptable.101 The sample is the collection of individuals that
were actually measured in order to obtain the empirical data. Sampling uncertainty is the potential
for error introduced precisely because the reasoning proceeds from statistics about a sample of
measured individuals to a conclusion about a more general population. Whether sampling
uncertainty is acceptable depends upon how representative (with respect to the association of A with
B) that sample is relative to the population described in the generalization. The plausibility of the
statistical generalization depends not only on the uncertainty inherent in the measurement processes,
but also on the uncertainty created by measuring the members of one sample as opposed to
another.102
The minor premise of the direct-inference syllogism identifies a definite subject S and
classifies that specific individual as being a member of group A. One possible type of evidence for
such a conclusion is the report of an eyewitness based upon her own perceptual observation.103 A
complete plausibility schema for observational reports based upon personal perception (a “personalobservation schema”) is likely to be very complicated, but some theorists have explored the
reasoning that forms the upper levels of that schema.104 According to a theory of uncertainty based
reliability and validity in the measurements of A and B are therefore necessary conditions for finding a
statistical generalization to be plausible.
101

For discussion and references on sampling uncertainty, see Walker, supra note 51, at 396-405.

102

The reasoning behind sampling uncertainty has two sub-branches, depending upon whether the
possible lack of representativeness can cause biased or random error in the assertion about the ratio of
B/A in the population. Walker, supra note 51, at 396-405.
103

An alternative line of reasoning to the same kind of conclusion is another direct inference, because
the conclusions of the direct-inference schema and of the personal-observation schema have the same
logical form (classifying a single definite subject into a category). The minor premise of one direct
inference might be warranted in a particular case by another direct-inference schema, and this chaining of
direct inferences might continue down the inference tree.
104

See SCHUM, supra note 25, at 100-09; KADANE & SCHUM, supra note 25, at 53-60; Walker, supra
note 67, at 1559-68. For a general analysis of Schum’s system, see Walker, supra note 25, at 392-404.
The plausibility of an assertion warranted by personal perception depends in part on whether an act of
perception actually occurred. For example, the plausibility of a witness’s claim to have seen a man
leaving the crime scene depends upon the witness’s having a clear line of sight to the man, upon the
witness’s visual capability, upon the lighting conditions, and so forth. An act of perception is itself a
specific causal occurrence between the thing perceived and the perceiver, and the plausibility that it
occurred depends in turn on generalizations about human perceptual abilities.
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on the analysis by Schum, the plausibility of the eyewitness report depends on three conditions: the
observational capability of the eyewitness, the witness’s memory about what she perceived, and the
witness’s veracity in accurately reporting what she remembers.105 Taken together, these three
branches constitute the credibility of the witness herself in asserting that she observed the subject S
as being an A.106 Additional conditions for the plausibility of the witness’s assertion that S is an A
are whether this assertion is consistent with the meaning of “being an A” (e.g., S must possess the
properties entailed by being an A), and whether the assertion is plausible in light of what else is
known about S (and about things like S).107 A plausibility schema for an eyewitness report about a
definite subject, therefore, would have a tree-like structure possessing these conditions in some
combination, and each branch could lead to further analysis.
The plausibility of the major and minor premises considered individually, however, does not
exhaust the potential for error in a direct inference. The generalization (the major premise) could be
plausible, as well as the categorization of S as an A (the minor premise), but the fit between these
premises and the conclusion can still cause uncertainty about the inference. One possible fallacy is
relying on the proportion B/A to make an inference about a specific individual S when there no
warrant for doing so. For example, 52% of U.S. citizens might be female, and a certain person S
might be a U.S. citizen, but finding on this basis alone a 0.52 probability that S is female would be
unwarranted without more information about S. The finding could be warranted by the additional
information that S has been randomly selected from the set of U.S. citizens. This reasoning is
familiar from predictions about lottery drawings. In a lottery drawing, the probability of drawing a
particular type of object (such as a numbered ball) is equal to the proportion of such objects in the
lottery pool, provided each object in the pool has an equal chance of being selected on the next
draw.108 Similarly in a direct inference, if there is warrant that the definite subject S is a randomly
drawn member of A with respect to being B, then the probability that S is a B will equal the ratio

105

SCHUM, supra note 25, at 100-09 (dividing observational capability into the “observational
sensitivity or accuracy” of the witness’s sensory evidence and the “objectivity” of the witness in
interpreting her sensory evidence).
106

Id.; KADANE & SCHUM, supra note 25, at 55-58.

107

Alibi evidence is a good example. If the factfinder believes that S was in California on a particular
date, it is implausible that S was also in New York on the same date, absent S’s taking some fast mode of
transportation.
108

See Walker, supra note 51, at 448-52 (discussing lottery mechanisms in which the proportions of
items to be drawn are known, as well as the probabilities for drawing them).
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B/A.109 In a case with suitable evidence, therefore, a factfinder may have the warrant to plausibly
conclude by direct inference that “the probability = B/A that definite subject S is (also) in category
B.”
The plausibility of the direct inference is also a function of the fit between the degree of
quantification in the generalization and the probability asserted within the conclusion.110 The size of
the ratio B/A asserted in the generalization (major premise) certainly limits the range of
probabilities that can plausibly be asserted in a conclusion.111 For example, if only “a few” As are
Bs, then this evidence alone cannot warrant a conclusion stating that “probably” S is a B. On the
other hand, if “most” As are Bs, then this evidence would warrant a conclusion that “probably” S is
a B, provided S is a random member of A with respect to B. Other things being equal, if the definite
subject S is a random member of A with respect to B, then as the proportion B/A increases, the
probability within a plausible conclusion can also increase; and as the proportion B/A decreases, the
plausible probability within the conclusion decreases.
The revised plausibility schema for direct inference therefore includes the major and minor
premise of the direct-inference syllogism, together with the two conditions just discussed:
109

In many legal cases, however, there is instead good evidence that the definite subject is not a
random member of A with respect to B, or there is documented ignorance of the nature of this
relationship. See, e.g., Walker, supra note 51, at 468-73. In such a case, a reasonable factfinder may still
be warranted in using the ratio B/A as a measure of the plausibility that the definite subject S is a B if the
reference group A is sufficiently representative of the definite subject S with respect to being B, so that
random selection is not required. For example, the reference group A may consist only of persons who are
like S on all causally relevant factors for being B. Id. at 439-73.
When the direct inference is not only a description or prediction of a property possessed by S, but also
an explanation that S’s being in category A caused S’s being in category B, then the plausibility schema
must contain as a condition of plausibility that the reference group A represents the definite subject S on a
sufficient number of the important variables that are causally relevant to being in category B. Id. at 43948.
110

This probability may be implicit, or it may be asserted explicitly. When it is asserted explicitly, it
often has the connotation of a modal hedge, see supra text accompanying notes 78-79. Not all modal
hedges express probability, however; some modal hedges, for example, limit the claim being made to
particular places or times. Id.
111

The use of mathematical probabilities within legal reasoning incorporates into that reasoning the
implication tree for the inference rules of the probability calculus. Assigning a particular probability value
to a particular type of event is plausible only if the value is calculated according to the mathematical rules
for calculating probabilities. For references on the probability calculus, see supra note 50. Cf. Walker,
supra note 25, at 413-30 (discussing problems and dangers inherent in the use of formalized languages,
such as the probability calculus, to help provide the warrant for legal factfinding).
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The text above has discussed each branch in turn, in enough detail to suggest additional schemas
that could prove plausibility for each branch. The plausibility connective “AND” conjoining the
branches makes the plausibility-value of the conclusion, insofar as it is warranted by a direct
inference, equal to the plausibility-value of the least plausible of these four conjuncts.
The direct-inference schema also illustrates how plausibility schemas can integrate scientific
or other expert evidence with lay, non-expert evidence. Expert knowledge domains supply evidence
for legal decision-making, often in the form of generalizations, and those generalizations become
evidentiary assertions within plausibility schemas. But those generalizations alone, no matter how
well established, cannot warrant a conclusion about a specific individual S. Doubts about S’s being
in category A or how S was selected from category A may seriously undermine the probative value
of the generalization in the particular case.112
This brief discussion of direct inference illustrates a number of logical features of
plausibility schemas. First, the appropriate schema to use in evaluating the plausibility of evidence
depends upon the logical nature of the conclusion being drawn and upon the type of evidence
offered to warrant that conclusion. The logical nature of the conclusion is determined by the
terminal proposition to which the evidence attaches. The evidence, however, might be eyewitness
testimony, or a direct inference based on a scientific generalization, or some other type of plausible

112

Schum uses the notion of “ancillary evidence” to test whether a generalization applies in a
particular instance. SCHUM, supra note 25, at 109-20, 187-92; KADANE & SCHUM, supra note 25, at 5253.
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reasoning. This means that, although the range of appropriate schemas is narrowed by the content of
the terminal proposition, plausibility schemas can seldom be “hard wired” onto implication trees.113
Second, the branches within a plausibility schema can themselves generate a chain of
plausibility schemas, with lower schemas providing the plausibility-values for evidentiary
propositions higher in the branch. This process generates lower branches of the complete inference
tree in a particular case, which has a three-valued implication tree for the top levels and plausibility
schemas of evidence for the lower levels.
Third, the goal of developing an adequate default logic for legal factfinding (and eventually
for policy balancing114) requires research into the variety of plausibility schemas that are acceptable.
Such research is partly empirical (to identify how legal factfinders actually reason) and partly
logical (to critique actual reasoning from the epistemic perspective). Moreover, such research is
needed into those schemas that combine quantitative and qualitative scales of plausibility, and
expert evidence with non-expert evidence. Finally, as the conclusion of this article will suggest,
research is needed into the dynamic between the rule-based reasoning in the top portion of an
inference tree and the generalization-based plausible reasoning in the bottom portion of an inference
tree. It is a hallmark of a true paradigm, however, that it creates promising research programs, by
structuring the logic of the inquiry and by providing criteria for success.
III.

LEGAL PROCESS RULES AND COMPLETE INFERENCE TREES

Modeling legal process rules, which govern the dynamics of default reasoning,115 requires
no new logical structures. Implication trees can model legal process rules in the same way that they
can model substantive legal rules. Concept-based entailments can establish necessary or sufficient
conditions for legal predicates or indefinite subjects. A balance of legal policies can justify adopting
legal process rules, just as they can justify adopting substantive rules. Process rules apply in a
113

There are instances, however, when legal authorities might seem to attach plausibility schemas to
terminal propositions as a matter of legal rule, as when a statute or regulation creates a substantive legal
presumption. E.g., Director, Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs, Department of Labor v.
Greenwich Collieries, 512 U.S. 267, 280-81 (1994) (discussing both statutory and administrative
presumptions applicable in adjudications under the Black Lung Benefits Act and the Longshore and
Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act). Such substantive rules are probably better modeled, however, as
defeaters incorporated within the implication tree.
114
115

See supra Part I.B.

Cf. Walker, supra note 36, at 135 (concluding that a “strategy behind factfinding in law is … to
maintain a dynamic process of rule-governed decision-making, through which (it is hoped) reasonable
decision makers will come close enough to achieving the epistemic objective over time”).
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particular case when the decision-maker attaches relevant evidence to the terminal propositions of
the process implication tree, structures and evaluates that evidence with plausibility schemas, and
uses the plausibility-values of evidentiary assertions to determine the truth-values of those terminal
propositions. In order to model default reasoning about legal process, therefore, no new logical
structures are needed – only new content for the structures developed in Parts I and II of this article.
The default-logic paradigm integrates substantive and process reasoning by connecting a
process implication tree to a substantive implication tree, usually as a conjunctive branch. Most
governmental actions are legitimate only if all applicable substantive and process rules are satisfied.
Sometimes a process tree connects to the substantive tree at a very high level, and states process
requirements for the entire action or decision. An example of such a high-level process condition is
whether a court or administrative agency has jurisdiction to act at all. Part III.A will discuss this
example. At other times, a process implication tree connects to the substantive implication tree at a
very low level, and prescribes conditions for only the low-level decision involved. Examples of
such low-level process conditions are a statutory rule that certain types of evidence are irrelevant to
a particular terminal proposition, or judicial rules about the admissibility of evidence. Such rules
govern decisions about attaching evidence to terminal propositions of a substantive tree. Part III.B
will discuss these examples. The complete implication tree for legitimating a governmental action,
therefore, consists of main substantive branches to which process branches connect at various
levels.
This part of the article discusses several major types of process rules. Because the same
process implication tree can connect to many substantive trees (e.g., process trees for deciding
jurisdiction), or can connect to many branches in the same implication tree (e.g., process trees for
deciding the admissibility of evidence), it is practical to study those process rules separately from
the substantive trees to which they connect. For the same reason, software modules to automate
process decisions could “launch” from any number of levels in a main substantive tree. The
traditional distinction between rules of procedure and rules of evidence also forms a useful
subdivision for process rules. The default-logic structure is the same, however, for procedural and
evidentiary decisions, so classifying any particular rule correctly is of little importance. This part of
the article, however, uses familiar examples from both the law of civil procedure and the law of
evidence to illustrate this application of the default-logic paradigm.
A.

Procedural Process Rules

The jurisdiction of a federal court illustrates a procedural condition branching at a high level
from the implication tree for any federal court judgment. The principal general bases for federal
district court jurisdiction include diversity jurisdiction,116 general federal question jurisdiction,117
116

28 U.S.C. § 1332. On jurisdiction generally, see JAMES ET AL., supra note 30, at §§ 2.24-2.31.
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admiralty jurisdiction,118 and actions in which the United States is a party.119 Such provisions, as
well as numerous statutes dealing with specific types of jurisdiction,120 provide the legal process
rules governing decisions about jurisdiction. For example, under federal diversity jurisdiction, the
rule “complete diversity” is that “all plaintiffs properly joined must have state citizenship different
from that of all the defendants.”121 Another rule is that, for purposes of diversity jurisdiction, a
corporation is considered a citizen of the state of its incorporation and of the state in which it has its
principal place of business.122 Implication trees can model these rules and make them conjunctive
branches in any case brought in federal district court under diversity jurisdiction.
As with any implication tree, the appropriate findings on the issues stated in the terminal
propositions depend on evaluating the relevant and available evidence. Some issues, such as the
state of incorporation of a corporate party, might be decided by stipulation of the parties or by
judicial notice.123 Other issues might be contested and raise triable issues of fact. For example,
under Article III of the United States Constitution, as interpreted by caselaw, a plaintiff must have
standing to bring the lawsuit for the court to have jurisdiction.124 While a particular plaintiff’s
117

28 U.S.C. § 1331 (authorizing actions “arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the
United States”).
118

28 U.S.C. § 1333.

119

E.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1345 (authorizing the United States to bring civil actions in federal courts).

120

E.g., 21 U.S.C. § 371(f) (conferring jurisdiction on the United States courts of appeals to review
and affirm or set aside certain orders of the Secretary of Health and Human Services entered under the
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act).
121

JAMES ET AL., supra note 30, § 2.24, at 98.

122

28 U.S.C. § 1332(c).

123

On the rules of judicial notice, see, e.g., FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE 201 (providing that “[a]
court shall take judicial notice if requested by a party and supplied with the necessary information,” and
that “[a] judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to reasonable dispute in that it is … capable of
accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned”).
124

E.g., Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 771
(2000) (addressing “the jurisdictional question whether respondent Stevens has standing under Article III
of the Constitution to maintain this suit”); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 559-66 (1992)
(setting out the three issues constituting “the irreducible constitutional minimum of standing”: a concrete
and particularized “injury in fact” to a legally-protected interest, a “causal connection between the injury
and the conduct complained of,” and a likelihood that the injury will be “redressed by a favorable
decision”).
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standing might be decidable on summary judgment, it is also possible that in an appropriate case a
trial of the issue of standing might be required.125 As with any issue stated in a terminal proposition
of an implication tree, in a particular case the evidence might require the issue to be decided by the
factfinder, or it might allow the issue to be decided by the court as a matter of law.126
Procedural rules govern the dynamics and timing of default reasoning by authorizing
interlocutory or final decisions whose conditions can be satisfied only over time. In a civil
proceeding in federal court, for example, a defendant may move to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction
on the basis of the pleadings,127 whereas a party seeking summary judgment often bases the motion
on depositions and other products of discovery, together with affidavits,128 and motions for directed
verdict or for judgment as a matter of law are decided upon the evidence produced at trial.129 Types
of motion vary by where they branch from the main implication tree, the nature of the issue raised
by the motion, and the nature of the evidence relevant to deciding that issue. From a logical
perspective, the timing of procedural motions is controlled by the content of the conditions specified
for granting the motions. The rules governing the granting of motions are themselves modeled by
implication trees, whose terminal propositions might be true only at certain times or stages of the
proceeding. The dynamics and timing of the public process of legal reasoning, therefore, are
controlled solely by content, with no new logical structures needed.

125

Id. at 561-62 (stating that each factual element “must be supported in the same way as any other
matter on which the plaintiff bears the burden of proof, i.e., with the manner and degree of evidence
required at the successive stages of the litigation” – namely, at the pleading stage, in response to a
summary judgment motion, and at trial).
126

For the rule when the factfinder is a jury, see FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 50(a)(1)
(providing that if “[i]f during a trial by jury a party has been fully heard on an issue and there is no legally
sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find for that party on that issue, the court may
determine the issue against that party and may grant a motion for judgment as a matter of law against that
party with respect to a claim or defense that cannot under the controlling law be maintained or defeated
without a favorable finding on that issue”).
127

FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 12(b).

128

See FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 56(c) (providing that summary judgment shall be
rendered “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with
the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party
is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law”).
129

See FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 50(a); JAMES ET AL., supra note 30, §§ 7.19, 7.21.
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B.

Evidentiary Process Rules

Within the default-logic paradigm, evidentiary process rules include much more than the
traditional law of evidence. Evidentiary process rules structure the decision-making process
involved in evaluating evidence and making findings or rulings on terminal propositions. This
includes rules about relevancy (attaching evidentiary assertions to terminal propositions)130; rules
about admissibility (either excluding some proffered evidence from the case altogether, or
prohibiting the attachment of particular items of admitted evidence to certain terminal
propositions)131; rules about sufficiency of evidence (deciding whether the totality of evidence
attached to a terminal proposition can reasonably warrant a finding that the proposition is true)132;
standards of proof (establishing the threshold degree of plausibility required to assign a truth-value
to a terminal proposition)133; and rules allocating the burden of persuasion (determining what
finding to make when the totality of attached evidence evaluates precisely on the threshold degree
of plausibility established by the standard of proof).134 All of these rules constrain the factfinder’s
discretion in evaluating the evidence and making findings, by allowing the presiding legal authority
to oversee the factfinding process. From a logical perspective, evidentiary process rules supply
implication trees for deciding issues raised by various kinds of motions.135
130

For example, rules about relevant and irrelevant factors, as discussed infra text accompanying notes
136-37.
131

E.g., FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE 407 (excluding evidence of “subsequent remedial measures” to
prove negligence or a defect in a product, but not requiring exclusion of such evidence “when offered for
another purpose, such as proving … feasibility of precautionary measures, if controverted”).
132

See JAMES ET AL., supra note 30, § 7.19.

133

See JAMES ET AL., supra note 30, §§ 7.5, 7.14 (discussing “the three generally recognized standards
of proof … : preponderance, clear and convincing, and beyond a reasonable doubt”); 2 MCCORMICK ON
EVIDENCE § 339, at 438 (John W. Strong ed., 4th ed. 1992); Walker, supra note 45, at 1075-78, 10971120 (discussing possible interpretations of the preponderance standard of proof, in light of the policies
behind the rule).
134

See JAMES ET AL., supra note 30, § 7.13 (discussing the “risk of nonpersuasion” as a “default rule”
and as a concept “inseparable from any system in which issues of fact are to be decided through rational
deliberation on the basis of incomplete knowledge”).
135

From the standpoint of designing software modules to automate decisions on motions, an
implication tree for deciding a substantive motion could “launch” from the appropriate proposition in the
main substantive tree. The appropriate proposition is the one whose truth-value will be determined by a
ruling on the motion.
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As with any implication tree, the appropriate findings to be made on the terminal
propositions of an evidentiary implication tree depend on evaluating the relevant and available
evidence. One type of evidentiary process rule prescribes what factors are relevant or irrelevant in
factfinding. The Supreme Court, for example, has held that the text of § 109(b) of the Clean Air
Act, which governs the promulgation of national ambient air quality standards (NAAQS),
“unambiguously bars cost considerations from the NAAQS-setting process.”136 What counts as a
“cost consideration” and whether an agency has taken costs into account are issues to be decided in
the particular case. According to the Court, if it could be proved that the agency “is secretly
considering costs of attainment without telling anyone,” then this “would be grounds for vacating
the NAAQS” adopted.137 In this example, the fact that an administrative agency is the factfinder
governed by the evidentiary process rule, and that the agency evaluates the evidence while setting a
particular NAAQS, does not change the underlying default logic. The example illustrates the
general applicability of the default-logic paradigm, regardless of the nature of the factfinder.
A second example of an evidentiary process rule, in which the trial court itself evaluates the
evidence and rules on the terminal propositions of an evidentiary implication tree, is decisionmaking about the admissibility of expert testimony. In order to admit an expert opinion under
Federal Rule of Evidence 702, federal district courts must find that the subject of the opinion is
“scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge” and that it “will assist the trier of fact.”138 The
opinion may be admitted only “if (1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the
testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the witness has applied the
principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case.”139 Evidence relevant to deciding these
issues is produced pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 104(a), either in written form or at an
evidentiary hearing.140 The trial court evaluates the relevant evidence and determines by a
136

Whitman v. American Trucking Assoc., Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 462, 471 (2001).

137

Id. at 471, note 4. Such relevant-factor rules may play a significant role in judicial review of agency
action. See, e.g., Motor Vehicle Mfr. Ass’n v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 42
(1983) (stating that an agency’s rule is arbitrary and capricious “if the agency has relied on factors which
Congress has not intended it to consider, [or] entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the
problem”); Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971) (holding that in
judicial review of an agency’s action for arbitrariness, an important issue is whether the agency’s decision
“was based on a consideration of the relevant factors”).
138

FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE 702.

139

Id.

140

FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE 104(a); Kumho Tire Company, Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. at 152
(stating that “[t]he trial court must have the same kind of latitude in deciding how to test an expert’s
reliability, and to decide whether or when special briefing or other proceedings are needed to investigate
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preponderance of the evidence whether these conditions are satisfied.141 On appellate review, the
standard of review for the district court’s evidentiary rulings is the deferential “abuse-of-discretion”
standard.142 A motion to exclude proffered expert testimony therefore triggers a decision-making
process governed by procedural and evidentiary process rules,143 which the default-logic paradigm
models using implication trees, concept-based entailments, plausibility schemas, and theories of
uncertainty.144

reliability, as it enjoys when it decides whether or not that expert’s relevant testimony is reliable”);
William W. Schwarzer & Joe S. Cecil, Management of Expert Evidence, in REFERENCE MANUAL ON
SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 39, 53-54 (Federal Judicial Center, 2d ed., 2000) (stating that the trial court “has
broad discretion to determine what briefing and evidentiary proceedings are needed for it to rule on
admissibility of expert evidence”).
141

See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592-93, note 10; Kumho Tire
Company, Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. at 152.
142

General Electric Company v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 141-43 (1997).

143

The trial court has considerable flexibility in tailoring the “reliability” proceedings to the opinion
and evidence proffered, so that it can balance both epistemic and non-epistemic policy objectives. See
Kumho Tire Company, Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. at 152-53 (stating that the Federal Rules of Evidence
“seek to avoid ‘unjustifiable expense and delay’ as part of their search for ‘truth’ and the ‘jus[t]
determin[ation]’ of proceedings”) (brackets in original).
144

The reported cases that involve admissibility determinations for expert testimony provide extensive
data for an empirical study of plausibility schemas. Because the trial-court rulings on the terminal
propositions of Federal Rule of Evidence 702 are mandated and subject to appellate review, lower-court
opinions contain voluminous examples of careful reasoning about the plausibility of inferences based on
complex scientific evidence. Indeed, each case “in the Supreme Court’s trilogy involved the proof of
causation in either a toxic tort or product liability case.” Margaret A. Berger, The Supreme Court’s
Trilogy on the Admissibility of Expert Testimony, in REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 9, 32
(Federal Judicial Center, 2d ed., 2000). For the complex reasoning discussed in the three cases, see
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 43 F.3d 1311 (1995) (judgment after remand from the
Supreme Court) (case involving the evaluation of epidemiologic, statistical, and other types of evidence
allegedly relevant to proving causation of limb reduction birth defects); General Electric Company v.
Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997) (case involving the evaluation of epidemiologic and animal-study evidence
allegedly relevant to proving causation of small cell lung cancer); Kumho Tire Company, Ltd. v.
Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999) (case involving the evaluation of physical evidence allegedly relevant to
proving causation of a tire blow-out).
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C.

Process Rules and Inference Trees

Procedural and evidentiary process rules control the dynamics of legal reasoning by their
content, and there is no difference in logical structure between process rules and substantive rules. A
complete inference tree for the legal reasoning in a particular case will include an implication tree
modeling the substantive and process rules that are applicable, with schematized evidentiary
assertions attached to the terminal propositions of both substantive and process branches. Because,
however, the same process implication tree connects to many substantive trees (e.g., process trees
for deciding jurisdiction), or connects to many branches in the same implication tree (e.g., process
trees for deciding the admissibility of evidence), it is practical to model those process rules
separately from the substantive trees to which they connect.145 In addition, distinctive non-epistemic
policies behind process rules make it efficient to justify process rules separately. Such separate
modeling and justification, however, should not obscure the identity of logical structure between
rules of substance and rules of process, or the fact that the main implication tree for a decision
includes branches for both kinds of rules.
Although administrative efficiency is a major policy objective for process rules, and
applying those rules often results in greater efficiency, there is no guarantee that process rules will
make legal proceedings more efficient. When the personal knowledge of the lawyers for the parties
and of the judge can determine the truth or falsehood of the terminal propositions of strategic
process rules, then the court can dispose of entire claims without the need for witnesses. For
example, a ruling that the court lacks jurisdiction warrants dismissal of the entire complaint.146 It is
not always possible, however, to decide even a high-level process rule early in the case. For
example, factfinding might be needed to decide whether the statute of limitations has been
satisfied.147 The creation of any process rule usually means the addition of new branches to
implication trees, and the elaboration of new rules under those additional branches ensures an

145

For the same reason, software modules automating process decisions can be written as selfcontained programs, and would “launch” from any number of levels in a main substantive tree.
146
147

See supra text accompanying notes 116-22.

E.g., Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 893 F.2d 541, 579 (3rd Cir. 1990), aff’d in part and rev’d in
part on other grounds, 499 U.S. 935 (1991) (holding that, in litigation that had begun in 1983, the district
court’s grant of summary judgment against the defendants on their statute of limitations defense was
inappropriate and that the issue would need to be tried).
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inexorable growth in complexity.148 Careful empirical research is required to determine whether,
when actual cases begin to apply those process rules, there is an actual increase in efficiency.149
CONCLUSION
The inference trees of the default-logic paradigm are designed to model the legal reasoning,
including the factfinding, that warrants the conclusions, decisions, and actions of any governmental
institution.150 The upper portion of any inference tree consists of an implication tree that models all
of the substantive and process legal rules that could affect the ultimate conclusion. Such implication
trees may be supplemented by more local, concept-based entailments, which warrant deductions
between branches of the same tree or of different trees. Policy-based reasoning aims at justifying the
legal rules (that is, the form of the implication trees) by using objectives and principles that are
outside the trees themselves. The legal rules modeled by implication trees and entailments should be
the same for all cases in the jurisdiction at any point in time, although the rules (trees and
entailments) can also change over time.
The lower portion of an inference tree for a particular case consists of evidentiary assertions
attached to the terminal propositions of the implication tree. The plausibility schemas that organize
those evidentiary assertions extend the inference tree downward and outward. This overall tree
structure shows the continuity and parallelism between rule adoption and evidence attachment,
between policy balancing and evidence evaluation, and between making legal rulings and finding
facts. Plausibility schemas also integrate into single patterns of reasoning both expert and nonexpert evidence. As the factfinder evaluates the plausibility of individual evidentiary assertions, the
148

A good example is the increase in complexity due to Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and the
Supreme Court’s trilogy elaborating rules under that rule of evidence. See supra text accompanying notes
138-44.
149

An advantage of the default-logic model of process rules is that it makes this complexity
transparent and an easier subject of empirical study. In the default-logic paradigm, additional process
rules always add complexity to the implication tree, and therefore increase the number of terminal
propositions that are in play. The research question is whether the content of those process rules actually
increases or decreases efficiency in actual cases (including factfinding).
150

Because the paradigm is based on logic, and not on any particular set of rules or legal system, the
models can capture the reasoning of any type of governmental institution for any type of action, including
court judgments and orders, administrative adjudications and rulemakings, and legislative and executive
determinations. They can model the reasoning of state and federal institutions in the United States, of
national and European Community institutions in Europe, and of international institutions such as the
World Trade Organization. The use of a single model for analysis therefore creates the possibility of
extensive comparative research.
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plausibility schemas warrant assigning truth-values to the terminal propositions of the implication
tree, which in turn determine the truth-values of propositions further up the implication tree.
Plausibility schemas, through the theories of uncertainty that they represent, make the evidentiary
warrant for default reasoning more transparent and formal.
These same logical structures can model legal process rules, which balance the epistemic
objective with such non-epistemic objectives as fairness and administrative efficiency. The
implication trees for procedural rules are conjunctive branches of main implication trees. The
implication trees for evidentiary rules supply the rules of decision for certain procedural trees – for
example, the admissibility rules used to decide motions to exclude proffered evidence. The defaultlogic paradigm shows how substantive and process rules together structure the legal reasoning in
any particular legal case.
The value of any paradigm lies in its ability not only to model and explain its subject matter,
but also to guide productive research into that subject matter. The default-logic paradigm provides a
universally applicable model for mapping legal reasoning.151 Implication trees for legal rules and
plausibility schemas for factfinding patterns allow researchers to model legal cases and legal areas
incrementally, while adding automatically to a cumulative logic model of legal knowledge. The
single framework for modeling legal rules allows comparative analyses of different sets of rules –
whether the comparison is between different sets of rules in the same jurisdiction at a given time, or
between stages in the development of the same set of rules over time, or between different sets of
rules in different legal jurisdictions. A single framework for modeling factfinding also allows
comparative analyses of different factfinding institutions, as well as comparative research into the
effectiveness and efficiency of those institutions. Finally, the paradigm allows all of this research to
be based empirically on actual rule systems and actual cases, not merely on abstract accounts of the
law. Such empirical research should also lead to testable theories about patterns of legal reasoning
and factfinding.152

151

The mapping metaphor is particularly apt in this context. Like the system of latitude and longitude,
which allowed explorers to map local coastlines in a way that automatically added the local map to the
evolving map of the globe, the default-logic paradigm allows legal researchers to map the reasoning and
factfinding found in any particular case in a way that automatically adds that reasoning to the evolving
model of legal rules or to the growing set of plausibility schemas.
152

For example, legal researchers can test hypotheses about how new legal rules evolve out of
established factfinding patterns or about how new plausibility schemas evolve within institutions that
conduct reasoned and transparent factfinding. Some areas of law are especially suited to such empirical
research, such as the evolution of legal rules and plausibility schemas under the Supreme Court’s trilogy
of cases interpreting Federal Rule of Evidence 702 (see supra text accompanying notes 138-44).
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The default-logic paradigm also makes the results of such research available for immediate
use. Artificial intelligence software can incorporate the inference trees of particular cases into a
coordinated system of “smart” legal “objects.”153 Such software should allow searches not merely
for legal documents that contain specified words, but also for legal decisions that contain specified
reasoning patterns. Such “smart searches” would make far better use of the vast legal databases that
are now available. Intelligent software would also allow more efficient management of the law and
the evidence within single complex cases, or among a large number of similar cases. It could help
provide high-quality legal services to more people at a lower cost, thus helping to achieve the rule of
law in society. Finally, these same attributes of transparency and usefulness could transform the
teaching of legal knowledge and skills – both during law school and after. For the default-logic
paradigm, especially when incorporated into intelligent software, is above all a framework to help
legal systems improve the legal reasoning and factfinding in the next legal case.
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In the field of artificial intelligence and object-based programming, an “object” is a self-contained
programming structure that can act as a unit within its environment. See, e.g., Michael Wooldridge,
Intelligent Agents, in MULTIAGENT SYSTEMS, supra note 6, at 28-36 (comparing computing objects and
agents); RUSSELL & NORVIG, supra note 6, at 322-28 (discussing categories and objects within
computing environments). Implication trees, plausibility schemas, and inference trees are themselves
suitable for programming as objects.

